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System health monitoring and sensor placement are areas of great technical
and scientific interest. Prognostics and health management of a complex system
require multiple sensors to extract required information from the sensed environ-
ment, because no single sensor can obtain all the required information reliably at
all times. The increasing costs of aging systems and infrastructures have become a
major concern, and system health monitoring techniques can ensure increased safety
and reliability of these systems. Similar concerns also exist for newly designed sys-
tems.
The main objectives of this research were: (1) to find an effective way for
optimal functional sensor placement under uncertainty, and (2) to develop a system
health monitoring approach with both prognostic and diagnostic capabilities with
limited and uncertain information sensing and monitoring points. This dissertation
provides a functional/information –based sensor placement methodology for moni-
toring the health (state of reliability) of a system and utilizes it in a new system
health monitoring approach.
The developed sensor placement method is based on Bayesian techniques and
is capable of functional sensor placement under uncertainty. It takes into account
the uncertainty inherent in characteristics of sensors as well. It uses Bayesian net-
works for modeling and reasoning the uncertainties as well as for updating the state
of knowledge for unknowns of interest and utilizes information metrics for sensor
placement based on the amount of information each possible sensor placement sce-
nario provides.
A new system health monitoring methodology is also developed which is: (1)
capable of assessing current state of a system’s health and can predict the remain-
ing life of the system (prognosis), and (2) through appropriate data processing and
interpretation can point to elements of the system that have or are likely to cause
system failure or degradation (diagnosis). It can also be set up as a dynamic moni-
toring system such that through consecutive time steps, the system sensors perform
observations and send data to the Bayesian network for continuous health assess-
ment.
The proposed methodology is designed to answer important questions such as
how to infer the health of a system based on limited number of monitoring points
at certain subsystems (upward propagation); how to infer the health of a subsystem
based on knowledge of the health of the main system (downward propagation); and
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System health monitoring and optimum sensor placement are areas of increas-
ing technical interest. Rising costs of aging systems and infrastructures have become
a major concern, and system health monitoring techniques are viewed as a way of
reducing costs while increasing safety and reliability of these systems.
One way to minimize both maintenance and repair costs as well as the proba-
bility of failures, is through continuous health assessment of systems and prediction
of future failures based on current health and maintenance history. Therefore, one
of the goals of implementing system health monitoring is to alleviate the growing
concerns over the maintenance of legacy equipment by replacing scheduled main-
tenance with as-needed maintenance and saving the cost of unnecessary mainte-
nance and preventing unscheduled maintenance activities. In other words, system
health monitoring allows condition-based maintenance (CBM) inspection instead of
schedule-driven inspections. Similarly, when new systems are designed and devel-
oped, appropriate system health monitoring can be embedded in design which is
expected to reduce the life-cycle operating cost.
Another method of utilizing reliability estimates of a system is to formu-
late a cost-effective maintenance plan, often called reliability centered maintenance
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(RCM). The goal of RCM methodologies is to find logical ways to identify what
equipment is required to be maintained on a preventive maintenance basis rather
than let it run to failure.
Reviewing current system health monitoring techniques and various sensor
placement optimization methods including Dhillon et al [1], Hart et al [2] and Vickers
et al [3], it is apparent that almost all of these methods have attempted to optimize
the physical location (geometry) of sensors. In addition, it is a common practice
to assume that all data sets inferred by sensors are non-overlapping. Data sets are
considered overlapping when: (1) the sets are drawn from observations that occur
at the same time, and (2) the sets are dependent on the same system or process.
Hamada et al [4] presented a Bayesian approach to combine data sets and other
statistics of events at all levels in a fault tree, and they assumed that data sets were
non-overlapping. Jackson and Mosleh [5], [6], [7] presented Bayesian methods to
analyze overlapping data sets, however, deriving the presented likelihood functions
might appear to be difficult. And finally, in most cases, the uncertainties associated
with sensors are ignored. Further details on current state of the art on sensor
placement and system health monitoring techniques are presented in Chapter 2.
The main motivation for this research was to develop an effective approach
for sensor placement based on sensors’ functional locations in a logic diagram to
monitor systems’ health more efficiently and also address the weaknesses in current
methodologies.
This research developed new algorithms for sensor placement under uncer-
tainty and utilized them in a new system health monitoring approach. The overall
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methodology is designed to answer important questions such as how to infer the
health of a system based on limited number of monitoring points at certain sub-
systems (upward propagation); how to infer the health of a subsystem based on
knowledge of the health of the main system (downward propagation); and how to
infer the health of a subsystem based on knowledge of the health of other subsystems
(distributed propagation).
Specifically, the main objectives of this research were to (1) find an effective
way for optimal functional sensor placement under uncertainty, and (2) develop a
system health monitoring approach with both prognostic and diagnostic capabilities
with limited, uncertain, and overlapping information sensing and monitoring points.
A system’s reliability information can be obtained through the placement of
sensors in various places of the system. However, in many applications, due to
physical, technological or resource limitations, one may not be able to place sensors
where they are needed the most. We developed a Bayesian framework to optimize
the sensor placement in a system based on functional locations, and to gather max-
imum reliability data about the system. Information metric is defined as a scale to
measure the amount of information each sensor placement scenario provides, and
its domain is a set of real numbers that can be interpreted directly as expected
gains on the chosen scale such as amount of information, entropy, etc. Bayesian be-
lief networks are utilized to combine the information obtained from evidence, with
our prior knowledge of the unknowns of interest being the failure probabilities of
lower level components, subsystems and system. This presents the heart of a novel
methodology for optimum sensor placement and health monitoring techniques in a
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complex system.
1.2 Overview of the Approach and Contributions
One of the strongest motivations for this research was to find a general method-
ology for sensor placement based on logical or functional placement of sensors. The
Bayesian methodology developed for placing the sensors throughout a system is
aimed at finding the optimum sensor placement scenario for extracting the most
amount of reliability information from the measured data. The approach takes
into account all uncertainties within the probabilistic framework and combines the
different sources of information using the rules of probability.
The Bayesian sensor placement (BSP) algorithms utilize Bayesian networks for
modeling, updating and reasoning the causal relationships and uncertainties as well
as for updating the state of knowledge for unknowns of interest (UOI) as they are
defined by (1) failure probabilities of lower level components, subsystems or system,
(2) value of parameters, and (3) the probability of physical parameters taking specific
values. “Information metrics” are used to assess the amount of information each
sensor placement scenario provides and the results are used to identify the optimized
sensor placement scenario based on the amount of information each possible sensor
placement scenario provides.
The process starts with identifying the system functional failure modes and
failure mechanisms and relevant stress models. A logic diagram (e.g. fault tree) is
chosen to represent the logical relationships among the components and subsystems
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within a complex system. A Bayesian network of the system is then constructed,
and through engineering considerations, several potential sensor placement scenarios
are identified. Lastly, the value of “information metrics” are used to compare the
amount of information among sensor placement scenarios.
Contributions of the research include:
• A new functional point sensor placement method based on Bayesian techniques
is developed which is capable of functional sensor placement under uncertainty.
– Bayesian networks are utilized for modeling, updating and reasoning the
causal relationships and uncertainties as well as for updating the state
of knowledge for unknowns of interest as they are defined by: failure
probabilities of lower level components, subsystems or system; value of
parameters; and the probability of physical parameters taking specific
values.
– “Information metric” is used to optimize sensor placement based on the
amount of information each possible sensor placement scenario provides.
– The placement process is based on functional locations od sensors on a
logic diagram.
– The uncertainty inherent in the characteristics of sensors is taken into
account.
– To model the case study and other presented examples, several algorithms
in MATLAB and other software programs are developed.
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• A new system health monitoring methodology is developed.
– The methodology is capable of assessing current state of a system’s health
and can predict the remaining life of the system (prognosis), and through
appropriate data processing and interpretation can point to elements of
the system that have or are likely to cause system failure or degradation
(diagnosis).
– It can be set up as a dynamic monitoring system such that through
consecutive time steps, the system sensors perform observations and send
data to the Bayesian network for continuous health assessment. This
makes the Bayesian network a dynamic Bayesian network.
1.3 Dissertation Overview
Chapter 2 presents a summary of current state of the art on subjects related
to sensor placement and system health monitoring. It starts with a summary of
literature on Bayesian sensor placement optimization followed by literature sum-
maries on other sensor placement optimization techniques, such as multi-objective
optimization, genetic algorithm, statistical methods and neural networks. The chap-
ter continues with literature review on system health monitoring under two major
categories: (1) Bayesian methods and system health monitoring, and (2) PHM and
other techniques for system health monitoring. It follows with an overview of other
relevant literature such as multi-sensor data fusion and a discussion on overlapping
and non-overlapping data sets. At the end of Chapter 2, a summary of shortcomings
6
and concerns in regard to current state of the art in sensor placement and system
health monitoring are presented.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of key building blocks and the proposed
methodologies for Bayesian sensor placement and system health monitoring. The
chapter starts with presenting Bayesian belief networks and dynamic Bayesian net-
works, followed by discussions on “information metrics” and “entropy”. The second
half of Chapter 3 is dedicated to overview of Bayesian sensor placement and the
proposed health monitoring system methodologies. It starts with a description of
Bayesian sensor placement algorithms, followed by an overview of the “inference en-
gine”. It then presents two new definitions: “components state vectors” and “sensor
information vectors (SIV)” and is continued by a description of sensor placement
algorithms. The chapter ends with an overview of the proposed health monitoring
system.
Chapter 4 presents the building blocks of the inference model construction for
the proposed Bayesian sensor placement algorithms. The chapter starts with an
overview of a power transformer chosen as a case study system. Then its functional
failure modes, failure mechanisms, and physics of failures are reviewed, followed by a
summary of various stress and life models. Then a sub-set of the power transformer
(partial system) is considered as the case study system. The rest of the chapter
deals with the details of building the Bayesian inference model, selecting potential
sensor types and locations, and building the components state vectors and sensor
information vectors.
Chapter 5 presents the proposed Bayesian framework algorithm for sensor
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placement using the case study system presented in Chapter 4. The details of the
developed algorithms show how to measure the amount of information for vari-
ous sensor placement arrangements for the case study. The prior knowledge of the
system is used to simulate numerous evidence sets which in turn provide several
posterior information sets in the form of “Sensor Information Vectors”. Informa-
tion metric functions are employed to compare the amount of information for various
sensor configurations and optimized sensor placement scenario is presented. In addi-
tion, solution for cases with no historical data is discussed as well. The Chapter ends
with scalability analysis for the proposed Bayesian sensor placement algorithms.
Chapter 6 presents another example to show the details of the proposed
Bayesian sensor placement methodology in a more complex system with a larger
Bayesian network model as well as larger historical data sets and more potential
sensor places. In this example, the BSP is utilized to find the best locations of
sensors for a power transformer taking into account all of its subsystems.
Chapter 7 presents the proposed Bayesian system health monitoring method-
ology in conjunction with the proposed Bayesian sensor placement techniques dis-
cussed in previous chapters. Chapter 7 starts with an introduction on system health
monitoring and then followed by an overview of current system health monitoring
philosophies and techniques. Then it is followed by details of the proposed Bayesian
system health monitoring methodology. The chapter ends with presentation of an
application of Bayesian system health monitoring in an example and presents various
scenarios as part of this example.
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the research methodology and its contribu-
8
tions. Also provided are suggestions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Current State of the Art
2.1 Introduction
Current sensor placement optimization methodologies are focused on optimiz-
ing the physical location (geometry) of sensors. Most of current health monitoring
systems operate in “upward propagation” of data and their goal is to infer infor-
mation at system level based on data gathered at component or subsystem levels.
In addition, it is almost a common practice to assume that all data sets inferred
by multiple sensors in one system are independent. Likewise, in most cases, the
uncertainties associated with sensors are assumed insignificant and ignored.
This chapter, reviews current state of the art in sensor placement optimiza-
tion methods, system health monitoring techniques, and a few other topics related
to sensor placement and health monitoring. We summarized all of the reviewed
literature on Bayesian sensor placement optimization in Section 2.2 and on system
health monitoring in Section 2.3 to present the range of current methodologies in
sensor placement optimization and health monitoring systems.
10
2.2 Current State of the Art in Sensor Placement Optimization (SPO)
The most widely used techniques for sensor placement optimization are based
on finding the best possible physical location of sensors, given the constraints.
Through the years, numerous methodologies have been proposed to achieve this
goal. These techniques include various Bayesian approaches as presented in [8], [9],
[10], [11] and [12]. Other approaches include multi-objective optimization [2], [13],
[14], [15], genetic algorithm [16], statistical methods [1], [3], [17] and neural networks
[18]. And Guratzsch [11], [12] utilized finite element analysis to find approximate
placement of sensors under uncertainty. Section 2.2.1 presents the current state
of the art in Bayesian sensor placement optimization methods and Section 2.2.2
presents the state of the art in other sensor placement optimization methods. Sec-
tion 2.3 presents the current state of the art in system health monitoring approaches.
2.2.1 Bayesian Sensor Placement Optimization Methods
Applications of Bayesian methodologies for sensor placement optimization are
mostly focused on updating the state of knowledge regarding the operating environ-
ment using sensory data [9]. In other applications, Bayesian techniques are used to
develop a smarter sensing strategy utilizing decision theoretic approaches [19]. In the
latter application, prior knowledge and evidence sets form one or more sensed points
are used to maximize an information metric function, with the goal of improving the
sensory strategies for the next sensing location. Most of the current literature on
Bayesian sensor placement optimization revolves around utilizing Bayesian decision
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theory to formalize an optimization problem [9], [11], [12]. The following sections
present samples of the current literature on Bayesian sensor placement optimization
and current approaches of these methodologies which are mainly used for optimizing
the “physical” location of sensors within a system.
2.2.1.1 Durant-Whyte Bayesian Approach
Durant-Whyte [20] presented an application of Bayesian methods for sensor
placement optimization. Specifically, he used a statistical decision theoretic ap-
proach (Bayesian Decision Theory) to develop a sensing strategy and to determine
the optimal sensing locations for performing recognition and localization operations.
2.2.1.2 Kristensen Bayesian Approach
Kristensen [10] presented another Bayesian approach for sensor planning to
be utilized in a robot. The method uses Bayesian decision analysis to decide what
sensing actions need to be taken in a dynamic situation (i.e. a robot operation).
The author’s approach to sensor planning is mainly on how to use the sensors given
that the decisions have already been made on what types of sensors to use and
where to place them. The main reason claimed for using a Bayesian approach
in aforementioned research was its framework, which allows for reasoning about
uncertainties as well as for modularity and scalability.





Figure 2.1: Dhillon’s sensor detection model
evaluate different sensing actions against each other according to their given tasks
and state of their environment. Then, based on assigned utility functions, cost or
benefit of different actions are evaluated and the most beneficial “sensing task” is
selected.
The problem is formulated through decision tree for various decision problems
for each sensor. The tree starts with a root decision as to what module this sensor
should be assigned and is followed by various chance nodes and decision nodes.
Typically the result of analyzing through decision tree is finding the “best” path
through different nodes. The same procedure needs to be repeated for all sensors
implemented in the system (i.e. robot).
2.2.2 Other Sensor Placement Optimization Methods
Dhillon et al [1] presented an optimization framework for sensor resource man-
agement with the goal of covering a specific two-dimensional field. In this method-
ology, the first assumption is that the sensor field is made up of grid points. The
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granularity of the grid (distance between consecutive grid points) is determined by
the accuracy with which the sensor placement is desired. The second assumption is
that the probability of detection of a target by a sensor varies exponentially with
the distance between target and the sensor. This model is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
A target at distance d from a sensor is detected by that sensor with probability
of e−αd where α can be correlated with the quality of sensor. The detectability of
the sensor will decrease as the distance between the target and sensor increase.
There is a very close resemblance between this approach and the famous art
gallery problem (AGP) which was addressed by the art gallery theorem. The AGP
can be stated as determining the minimum number of guards required to cover the
interior of an art gallery (the interior of the art gallery is represented by a polygon)
with one main difference that, in contrast to the guards in AGP, sensor detection
outcomes are probabilistic.
Hart et al [2], through a joint program between Sandia Lab and the US En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA), developed a sensor placement optimization
toolkit (SPOT) for contamination detection in drinking water. The main idea of
SPOT is to place n sensors on a set of L vertices, with the objective of minimizing
the expected impact of a set A of contamination events. The optimization of mean









xai = 1 ∀a ∈ A




si ∈ {0,1} ∀i ∈ L
0 ≤ xai ≤ 1 ∀a ∈ A
where a is a contamination event with likelihood of αa such that ∑a∈Aαa = 1; si is
the binary decision variable for each potential sensor location i ∈ L which is equal
to 1 if a sensor placed in location i and 0 if not; La is a subset of locations that
could be contaminated by event a; dai is the pre-computed contamination impact of
event a; xai indicates whether the event has been detected or not; and daixai is the
impact of event a for all locations.
Vickers et al [3] used environmental information, derived from a computational
river current model, to optimize sensor placement, increasing detection rates and
decreasing the number of required sensors. In a case study, they focused on a
small segment of the Hudson River adjacent to New York City and used a variety
of available environmental data, such as current speed at different points of the
river, etc. A diver’s interaction with the environment was modeled to describe the
likelihood of a diver choosing or managing to swim in water of various current speeds.
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Figure 2.2: Equally distributed arrangement of 35 sensors across 1340 meter wide
of river. Vertical lines represent shore lines. Circles represent maximum detection
range of sensors [3].
Figure 2.2 shows a cross section of the river with 35 sensors across 1340 meter wide
of river. The conditional probability that the ith sensor from this array will detect
the diver, given that he crosses the line at a particular point, x, will be P (Di ∣x).
Assuming independence among the sensors’ operations, the total probability
of a diver, crossing at point x, being detected by the sensor array is given by
P (DT ∣x) = 1 − P (D̄T ∣x) = 1 −∏
i
(1 − P (Di ∣x)). (2.2)
Stolkin et al (and others) calculated the terms P (Di ∣x) as
P (Di ∣ x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0.95(1 − ∣x−xi∣50 ) if 0 ≤ ∣x − xi∣ < 50
0 all other ∣x − xi∣
(2.3)
where xi denotes the position of the sensor.
Figure 2.2 shows 35 sensors equally distribute across the Hudson river. It
also shows how much overlap the sensors create, which in turns, provide relatively
high probability of detection. Ignoring the environmental effects and assuming (er-
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Figure 2.3: Optimal arrangement of 35 sensors to maximize total probability of
detection, given prior knowledge of the environment derived from computational
current model [3].
roneously) that the diver is equally likely to attempt an attack in any part of the
river, leads to the conclusion that probability of detection at any point of the river
will be equally distributed.
To optimize the placements of sensors with respect to the additional environ-
mental information, standard non-linear optimization techniques were used to op-
timize all sensor positions using total probability of a diver will be detected should
he attempt to cross the sensor array line, which can be calculated by
P (DT ) = ∫
x on west bank
x on east bank
P (DT ∣ x) p(x) dx. (2.4)
Figure 2.3 shows the layout of sensors when optimized with respect to the
prior environmental information.
2.3 Current State of the Art in System Health Monitoring
The current literature refers to a variety of health monitoring systems with
almost similar goals: better prognosis and better diagnosis. Among them are: struc-
tural health monitoring (SHM), system health management, health management
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(HM) model, prognostics and health management (PHM), software health manage-
ment (SWHM) system, system reliability monitoring, etc. Many of these health
monitoring systems utilize Bayesian inference techniques for learning complex sys-
tems and for updating the state of knowledge for unknowns of interest. In addition,
in recent years, due to significant progress in artificial intelligence, researchers have
started realizing the vast potentials of Bayesian belief networks for utilizing in var-
ious monitoring systems.
This section presents a summary of current state of the art in system health
monitoring. Given that this field is relatively new, therefore there is no formal
classification of topics. We divided the literature to two large categories on this
subject: (1) health monitoring systems using Bayesian methodologies , and (2)
Health monitoring systems utilizing various PHM and other techniques.
2.3.1 Bayesian Methods and System Health Monitoring
Dawsey et al [21] presented a real-time water distribution monitoring system
utilizing “dynamic Bayesian networks (DBN),” which will be discussed further in
Chapter 3. New observations are combined with past system behavior through the
application of DBN. Bayesian networks were used to model discrete and continues
variables, and also to represent causal relationships. The variables such as hydraulic
head at monitoring points, a pump operational status, presence of biological con-
taminants at a node and concentration of certain chemicals at monitoring points are
considered as variables or inputs to the Bayesian network. Assuming a pre-defined
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time step, the DBN is intstantiated by the variables from monitored points. Then
the current state of nodes that are not monitored, are inferred from current obser-
vation data sets and knowledge of previous states. This is a classic use of dynamic
Bayesian networks.
Maglogiannis et al [22] utilized Bayesian networks for modeling and risk analy-
sis for patients with chronic diseases to better mange chronic care, to control health
delivery costs, and increase the quality of health delivery systems.
Morales et al [23] used Bayesian networks combined with Markov chain Monte
Carlo and Bayesian Score methodologies for system health monitoring of fuel cells.
Wang et al [24] utilized Bayesian networks for autonomous diagnosis of web
services such as document delivery through the internet, etc. In this approach, the
web alerts (i.e. a service being unavailable) were used as a diagnosis, and several
observable variables were used as evidences to model through a Bayesian network
as a tool for “reasoning.”
2.3.2 PHM and other Techniques for System Health Monitoring
Iverson [25] at NASA Ames Research Center utilized data mining methodolo-
gies as system and software health monitoring tools for NASA’s spaceships. Obvi-
ously, mission critical systems such as spaceships are equipped with abundant num-
ber of monitoring systems for subsystems and components. Iverson employed exist-
ing data mining techniques for anomaly detection to utilize the wealth of knowledge
available from other monitoring systems for more sophisticated health monitoring
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systems.
More specifically, two data driven software tools were utilized: Orca, and the
Inductive Monitoring System (IMS). Orca looks for unusual data points or outliers
by calculating the distance of data points from neighboring points. IMS uses cluster-
ing techniques to analyze archived spacecraft data to recognize nominal interactions
among selected parameters and stores it in its knowledge base. During the operation
of spaceships, these parameters are compared with the knowledge base to produce
a measure of how well the monitoring data match the nominal state of operation.
Martin et al [18] used artificial neural networks for structural health moni-
toring. The presented approach uses an array of piezoelectric sensors to emulate
receptor connectivity of the biological nervous system, along with neural networks
for structural health monitoring.
In 2010, GE Aviation Systems announced their Integrated Vehicle Health Man-
agement (IVHM) solution [26] and claimed that “it would work as a virtual proactive
maintenance, determining the status of the aircraft and its subsystems”. The on-
board portion of the management unit is capable of communication with ground
services for storage and further analysis. According to GE, this web-based health
monitoring system is intended to monitor the entire aircraft and has the potential
to reduce both unscheduled and scheduled maintenance, reduce return to service
time, and reduce overall operations and maintenance costs.
Roemer et al [27] and Sheldon et al [28] used prognostics and health man-
agement methodologies as a health monitoring tool for gas turbine engine bearings.
They used a component-level prognostic approach and utilized available sensor in-
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formation from vibration transducers, along with material-level component fatigue
models to calculate remaining useful life for the engine’s critical components such
as bearings.
Byington et al [29] used on-line fuel oil quality monitoring as a way of assessing
the health of diesel engines. Their rationale was that maintaining healthy fluid
systems is critical to keeping machinery in a high readiness state. In other words,
they used the fuel oil quality as the “canary in the mine” for the health of engine
operation.
The Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering (CALCE) of the Univer-
sity of Maryland is extensively involved with prognostics and health management
(PHM) research. Cheng et al [30] presented a sensor selection strategy specifically
for prognostics and health monitoring. They provided a sensor selection procedure
with three major components. First, they provided a detailed list of consideration
such as: parameters to be monitored, requirements for physical characteristics of
PHM sensor system, requirements for the functional attributes of PHM sensor sys-
tem, cost, reliability, and availability. The second step, involves with searching the
available sensors and the third step deals with tradeoffs.
Kumar et al [31] presented “symbolic time series analysis technique for health
monitoring of electronic products. They divided their analysis in four steps. In the
first step, data sets are collected from a healthy system and time series are calculated.
The second step involves with reduction of noise and conversion of the time series to
symbolic time series. In the third step, Markov state model from symbolic time series
are constructed. And the last step is involved with the identification of prognostics
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measures to detect anomaly during system diagnosis and prognosis.
Vichare et al [32] utilized CALCE Life Consumption Monitoring (LCM) method-
ology as a health monitoring technique for analyzing product take-back decisions.
The core of CALCE LCM methodology includes six main steps: (1) conduct failure
modes, mechanisms and effect analysis, (2) conduct a virtual reliability assessment
to assess the failure mechanisms with the earliest time-to-failure, (3) monitor ap-
propriate product environmental and operational parameters, (4) conduct data sim-
plification to make sensor data suitable for stress and damage models, (5) perform
stress and damage accumulation analysis, and (6) estimate remaining life of the
product.
He et al [33] proposed the use of Dempster–Shafer theory (DST) and the
Bayesian Monte Carlo (BMC) method for prognostics of lithium-ion batteries. First,
they developed an empirical model of physical degradation behavior of lithium-ion
batteries. Then, to properly estimate the models parameters, available battery
data sets along with Dempster–Shafer theory (DST) were used to initialize these
parameters. Then actual battery monitoring data and BMC were used to update the
model parameters and predict the remaining useful life of the batteries. The authors
state that as the system continued monitoring the batteries and more battery data
became available, the accuracy of the model in estimating remaining useful life was
improved.
Kumar et al [34] presented a methodology for selecting precursor parameters
for health monitoring. They start with failure modes, mechanisms, and effects
analysis (FMMEA) and life cycle profile analysis of the product to be monitored
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and risk priority numbers (RPN) of each failure mechanism is calculated. The
performance parameters that can be associated with the failure mechanisms with
higher RPN are selected for health monitoring of the product.
2.4 Overview of Other Relevant Literature
In this section, we review two other important topics related to Bayesian sensor
placement optimization and system health monitoring. Section 2.4.1 presents an
overview of multi-sensor data fusion techniques and Section 2.4.2 reviews the concept
of overlapping data sets.
2.4.1 Multi-Sensor Data Fusion
One of the basic methods of reducing uncertainty, is performing multiple ob-
servations from a single source. This could translate to aggregating the data in a
rational way. Another method of reducing uncertainty is obtaining more complete
knowledge of the state of nature by using multiple sources of data and utilizing data
fusion methods. When using data from diverse sources, two major concerns arise.
The first is the relevance of each data point with regard to the state of nature.
Second, how reliable each data point is [9].
Let’s assume N is the set of all available information sources (sensors)
N = {i}, for ∶ i = 1,2,3, . . . ,N. (2.5)
The most simplest and rational way of sensors’ data fusion could be obtaining a
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weighted average of sensors’ direct measurements, x
′







where ∑j wj = 1.
Obviously, this rather simplistic method comes with its own shortcomings.
First, it does not take into account the uncertainties inherent in the nature of sensors.
The other problem is that some sensor measurements, z may not be necessarily
correlated with the state of x. One way to overcome these difficulties, could be
fusion of data in probabilistic sense. This will build a probabilistic description of
the sensing and the inference process.
Let’s define the set of all observations made by the set of sensors N up to the
time step k as
{Zk} = ∪iZki , ∀i ∈ N , (2.7)
where
Zki = {zi(1), zi(2), zi(3), ..., zi(k)},
and Zki is information source i
′s set of observations up to the time step k. Then
compute the posterior distribution p(x ∣ {Zk}), given the information contributed
by each source [9], [35].
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2.4.2 Overlapping and Non-Overlapping Data Sets
It is customary to use only lower level information and statistics in analysis
of fault trees. Typically, the quantitative analysis of fault trees include three main
steps: (1) determining the basic event probabilities, (2) identifying the cut sets and
calculating the minimal cut set probabilities, and (3) determining the system (the
top event) relevant statistics. This can also be labeled as “upward propagation” of
data when analyzing the fault trees.
Given that in real systems operation, testing might generate data sets at var-
ious levels in a system which are not necessarily all “basic event” data sets. Conse-
quently, it is important to have a process to include data sets at all levels of a fault
tree when analyzing it.
Hamada et al [4] presented a fully Bayesian approach to combine data sets
and other statistics of events at all levels in a fault tree. Therefore, in quantita-
tive analysis of a fault tree, the propagation of data is not limited to only from
basic events to top event. Hamada assumed that data sets are non-overlapping and
presented a Bayesian approach which can simultaneously combine basic events and
“independent” higher-level data sets in a fault tree analysis.
Overlapping data sets analysis has been discussed in various literature. Graves
[36] proposed methodology to incorporate overlapping data sets for binary state on-
demand system. It considers each demand in isolation and cannot incorporate data
from multiple demands on the system.
Jackson and Mosleh [5], [6], [7] presented Bayesian methods to analyze over-
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lapping data sets and defined the overlapping data sets are those that: (1) the sets
are drawn from observations that occur at the same time (simultaneity); and (2)
the sets are dependent on the same system or process (correspondence). He used
the methodology to find function-point optimum sensor placement. A related ex-
ample of overlapping data is collecting data sets from multiple sensors in a system.
Jackson and Mosleh developed a methodology that allows overlapping data that is
based on multiple demands of a binary state on-demand system to be analyzed. He
developed a three-step process to compute the overlapping data likelihood function
that observes the permutations of all possible instances of (i.e.) component failures.
The relevance of discussion about overlapping and non-overlapping data sets
in this dissertation is that one of the main goals of this research is to optimize sensor
placement based on sensors’ functional locations in a logic diagram (e.g. fault tree).
That means the sensors may be placed at different levels of a logic diagram and
the input data may come from different levels of fault tree. Therefore, considering
current methods, it is important to know the type of data sets (for example) whether
overlapping or non-overlapping to properly treat the data and include in analysis.
In addition, it is important to have the capability of analyzing a logic diagram
both “upward” and “downward” accurately. Because most of reliability analyses
are involved with assessing the status of system and inferring the health of sub-
systems or components. This is a common example of downward propagation of
information. In other analyses we may need to estimate the reliability of a system
based on the knowledge of components or subsystems. This represents an example
of upward propagation of data. In all of these cases, considering available method-
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ologies including Hamada’s and Jackson’s, it is important for the analyst to know
whether the data sets are overlapping or not. We will discuss how our presented
methodologies will simplify the analyses related to overlapping and non-overlapping
data sets as well as upward and downward propagation.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, summaries of current state of the art on subjects related
to sensor placement optimization and system health monitoring were presented.
Chapter started with a summary of current sensor placement optimization methods
and followed by the state of the art in system health monitoring. Multi-sensor
data fusion concept was briefly touched and the chapter ended with a discussion on
treatment of overlapping and non overlapping data sets.
Reviewing various sensor placement optimization methods and health moni-
toring systems, the following shortcomings were recognized:
1. Sensor placement optimization
a. Most of the current methods assume that the data sets are non-overlapping
[4], which is a significant assumption.
b. Majority of sensor placement optimization methods have attempted to
optimize the physical location (geometry) of sensors [1], [3], and none of
the reviewed studies referred to “logical” or “functional” placement of
sensors.
c. Almost all methods concentrate on upward propagation. In other words,
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their goal is to optimize inferring information at system level based on
data gathered at component or subsystem levels. Except for the work by
Jackson and Mosleh [5], [6], [7], none of the reviewed literature had sug-
gested methodologies for both upward and downward propagation that
can be used for prognosis and diagnosis.
d. Some of the presented sensor placement methodologies utilize qualitative
techniques such as failure mode, mechanisms, and effects analysis (FM-
MEA) [30], [34] which are considered subjective screening tools. Cheng
et al [30] started with FMMEA to identify the parameter that need to
be monitored for PHM implementation.
e. In many cases, to simplify the analysis, the uncertainties associated with
sensors have been ignored [1].
f. Many of the sensor placement optimization methods suffer from compu-
tational complexity, which were acknowledged by the method developers
[1].
2. Sensor placement optimization
a. Many health monitoring systems are focused only on certain contributors
to system failures (i.e. vibration) and disregarded others [37].
b. Some of the health monitoring systems are faced with the challenges of
properly modeling the systems due to to many reasons including lack of
data to verify model’s parameters.
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c. Other health monitoring systems have difficulty with real time reasoning
mainly due to resource constraints including limited memory and proces-
sor speed.
This research developed a new approach in sensor placement based on sensors’
functional locations in a logic diagram, and utilized core aspects of the methodology
in a new system health monitoring and also addressed shortcomings mentioned
in 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.e, 2.a and 2.c. The new Bayesian sensor placement method is
based on Bayesian techniques and is capable of functional sensor placement under
uncertainty using reliability of components and subsystems as metrics of interest.
It also takes into account the uncertainty inherent in the characteristics of sensors.
It uses Bayesian networks for modeling and reasoning the uncertainties as well as
for updating the state of knowledge for metrics of interest. It utilizes information
metrics for sensor placement based on the amount of information each possible
sensor placement scenario provides on reliability metrics. And finally, it significantly
decreases the computational complexities of current methodologies. For example
Jackson and Mosleh [5], [6], [7] sensor placement methodology requires calculation
of complex likelihood functions, while in our proposed method, Bayesian network
are significantly reducing these difficulties.
A new system health monitoring methodology is also developed which is ca-
pable of assessing current state of a system’s health and can predict the remaining
life of the system (prognosis), and through appropriate data processing and inter-
pretation can point to elements of the system that have or are likely to cause system
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failure or degradation (diagnosis). Also it can be set up as a dynamic monitoring
system such that through consecutive time steps, the system sensors perform ob-
servations and send data to the Bayesian network for continuous health assessment.
This makes the Bayesian network, a dynamic Bayesian network.
Similar to any other new methodology, our approach presents areas for im-
provement too. One area is the use of Bayesian network and its exponential com-
plexity with the increased size of the network. This is also true for almost any
algorithm that uses Bayesian network. Another area is our reliance on historical
data that may not always be available which is true for other methodologies too.
Chapter 5 discusses these issues and presents potential solutions and in Chapter 8
we present suggestions for future research on these and other related topics.
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Chapter 3
Overview of the Proposed Methodology
3.1 Introduction
One of the strongest motivations for this research was to find a general method-
ology for optimum sensor placement based on logical or functional placement. The
Bayesian methodology developed for optimally locating the sensors throughout a
system is aimed at finding the optimum sensor placement scenario for extracting
the most amount of reliability information from the measured data. The approach
takes into account all uncertainties within the probabilistic framework and combines
the different sources of information using the rules of probability.
The developed Bayesian sensor placement (BSP) algorithm utilizes Bayesian
networks for modeling, updating and reasoning the causal relationships and un-
certainties as well as for updating the state of knowledge for unknowns of interest.
Information metrics are used to assess the potential information gain for each sensor
placement scenario and the results are used to select the sensor placement scenario
with the highest amount of reliability information.
This chapter provides all necessary background information on key building
blocks of the proposed sensor placement methodology and health monitoring system.
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3.2 Overview of Key Building Blocks
This section presents three key building blocks of the proposed methodology.
They include Bayesian belief networks, dynamic Bayesian networks, and “informa-
tion metric”.
Bayesian belief networks are utilized for modeling, updating and reasoning the
causal relationships and uncertainties as well as for updating the state of knowledge
for unknowns of interest (UOI) as they are defined by: failure probabilities of lower
level components, subsystems or system; value of parameters; and the probability
of physical parameters taking specific values.
Dynamic Bayesian networks are used as the backbone of an online monitor-
ing system such that through consecutive time steps, the system sensors perform
observations and send data to a Bayesian network for continuous health assessment.
“Information metrics” are used to assess the amount of “reliability informa-
tion” each sensor placement scenario provides and the value of information metrics
are used to select the sensor placement scenario that provides the highest amount
of information.
3.2.1 Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN)
A Bayesian belief network or Bayesian network, also known as a Bayesian
net, is a graphical modeling tool for specifying probability distributions that utilizes
directed graphs together with associated set of probability tables. These graphical
structures are used to represent knowledge about a system. In particular, each
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node in the graph represents a random variable, while the edges between the nodes
represent probabilistic dependencies among the corresponding random variables.
These conditional dependencies in the graph are often estimated by using known
statistical and computational methods [38], [39], [40].
A BBN is a compact representation of the joint probability distribution of the
system variables. Formally, it is known as an acyclic directed graph (DAG) with
nodes connected by arcs. The nodes are random variables whose values represent the
observed or unobserved system variables. The arcs represent the causal relationship
between variables. They are quantified by the conditional probabilities that a child
node would reach to a certain value, given values of all its parent nodes [41].
BBN can also be used to represent the generic knowledge of a domain expert,
and to function as a computational architecture for storing factual knowledge and
manipulating the flow of knowledge in the network structure. The graph structure
in the network significantly reduces the storage required for the joint probability
distribution, and the computational burden associated with the inference process
[41].
Causal Networks and d-Separation. A causal network consists of a set of
variables and a set of directed links (also known as arcs) between variables [38].
Specifically, the structure is called a directed graph. In a causal network, a variable
represents a set of possible affairs.
Figure 3.1 shows a simple causal network with only serial connections. It is
obvious that a has an influence on b, and b in turn has influence on c. Therefore,
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A B C
Figure 3.1: A serial connection in causal network
evidence about a will influence b and in turn c. Similarly, evidence on c will influence
the certainty of a and b.
On the other hand, when the state of b is known, then the channel between a
and c is blocked and they become independent. In this case, we say that a and c
are d-separated given b. Additionally, when the state of a variable is known, such
as variable b in this example, we say that the variable is instantiated [38].
BBN Structure. In a BBN, each node represents a variable and relationships are
indicated with arcs. The nodes must be defined in such a way that each node is a
distinctly defined entity, even if it is causally influenced by other elements. For ex-
ample in Figure 3.1 we can define three separate nodes and we can logically connect
them to create a simple BBN with three nodes. The first step in development of the
causal model is to identify the variables to be included as nodes in the model. This
is not a trivial task since the variables in the model must be distinctly defined. The
second step is to identify the relationships (arcs) between the variables. The arcs are
used to represent a causal relationship between two variables, with the arrowhead
indicating the direction of the influence. In Figure 3.1 node a is a root node as it
has no arcs pointing into it. Node c is an end node as it has no arcs pointing out of
it. Node b has one parent node a and one child node c [42].
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BBN Quantification. After all relationships among BBN nodes are defined, a
marginal or conditional probability table is assigned to each node. These probabil-
ity tables contain all known information concerning the state of the system based
on both expert opinion and available data. In a BBN, each node is assigned a
probability distribution based on the possible states of its parent nodes. Once each
probability distribution is set, the initial model is complete. As new information
becomes available, the probabilities of all nodes in the model can be automatically
updated based on the evidence [42].
Each node in a discrete BBN has a finite number of possible states. Many
BBNs use binary nodes, where 0 and 1 represent the positive and negative states of
the node. The sum of the marginal probabilities of all states within the same node
must equal 1. Each possible state of a root node is quantified with the marginal
probabilities of the states. For example in Figure 3.1, node a would be the only node
quantified with marginal probabilities. Assuming that a has two possible states of
P (a) = p and P (a) = 1 − p = q [42].
Nodes with one or more parents are quantified with conditional probability
tables (CPT). The size of the conditional probability table depends on the number
of parents. The conditional probability table will contain values for every possible
combination of states of the node and its parents. For a binary node with n parents,
the conditional probability table will contain (2(n+1)/2) columns. Each column in
the conditional probability table must add up to 1. Table 3.1 shows a simple con-
ditional probability table for nodes a and b of Figure 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Conditional probability table for node b with a single parent a
Parent
P (a) P (a)
Child
P (b) P (b∣a) P (b∣a)
P (b) P (b∣a) P (b∣a)
Hard Evidence (Instantiation). Hard evidence (instantiation) for a node X is
evidence that the state of X has definitely a particular value. For example, sup-
pose X represents the result of a particular college basketball game match (win,
lose, draw). Then an example of hard evidence would be the knowledge that the
match is definitely won. In this case we also say X is instantiated as the value “win”.
Soft Evidence. Soft evidence for a node X is any evidence that enables us to
update the prior probability values for the states of X. In other words, the evidence
is not conclusive. For example, we may get an unreliable report that event X hap-
pened which in turn may increase our belief in event X, but not to the point that
we would consider it certain. One of the key concerns related to soft evidence is
how to specify its strength [40].
Discretization of Bayesian Networks. When the node variables in a BBN take
continues values, the network is considered continues BBN. Generally, analyzing
continues BBN is a difficult task. For example, conditional distributions can only
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be linear functions of the parent nodes. The computational burden increases expo-
nentially with the number of possible states at each node. The amount of memory
for storing tables of conditional probabilities also increases dramatically. It is there-
fore, imperative that when the continuous BBN is discretized, the number of states
at each node is kept at a minimum. To maximize the usefulness of discrete states, a
maximum entropy criterion is adopted in the determination of the optimal partition
of the range of each continuous variable [41].
For continuous BBNs with arbitrary nonlinear conditional probability distri-
butions, the BBNs must first be approximated by a discrete BBN. A discrete BBN
is one in which each node can only take on finite number of values (states). The dis-
cretization process amounts to partitioning the continuous probability distribution
function into intervals [41].
Let’s assume that the continuous range of the variable associated with a node
has been partitioned into n segments, a1, a2, . . . , an. Let the prior probability of
the occurrence of the ith segment ai be pi. We can view the discretized node as an






and we wish to adjust the partition so that H(S) is maximized [41]. It is easy to
see that the optimal solution is given by pi such that each interval is as likely to
happen as the other, or








Figure 3.2: A Bayesian network to illustrate discretization algorithm
To formulate an algorithm for discretization, suppose we have a Bayesian
network as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Node C has two parents A and B. D has
three parents C, B and E; and C and D have a common parent B.
If we specify that we want to get the prior probability table for Node D, the
algorithm will check if the parent nodes of node D have been segmented and the
joint probabilities of B, C, and E are available [41]. Following is summary of the
major steps of the algorithm.
Segmentation: This procedure segments the probability distribution of a variable
into a desired number of intervals. The segmenting points along the value range and
centroids of each interval are calculated and recorded in a structure representing this
node. Least Square Error (LSE) approximation is employed to evaluate integration.
Joint Probability: In a set of parent nodes, either all the nodes have one or more
common ancestors, or some of them have. This set can be divided into several subsets
of nodes with common ancestors or no ancestors. Zhong et al [41] used “unit” to
represent these subsets. If there is only one unit and there is one parent node in it,
the joint probability actually is the prior probability of the only parent. Otherwise,
the joint probability can only be acquired either by looking for the joint probability
38
entity with this set of parent nodes or marginalizing a joint probability entity with
a set of nodes which include all the parents’ nodes. If there are multiple units
and they are independent to each other, the joint probability could be calculated
separately, then combined together by simple multiplication. This process resembles
to acquiring joint probability of independent variables.
Conditional Probability: The procedure for calculating conditional probability is
the main procedure in this algorithm. Main recursion occurs here. When the desired
node in a Bayesian network is assigned to this procedure, it checks if its parent(s)
has been segmented. If not, the procedure will call itself to process those parents.
This is the main recursion in this algorithm. A Bayesian network is an acyclic di-
rected graph. There is no loop in the graph. Therefore, by such recurrence, the
ancestor nodes could be eventually reached and the recursion is terminated. All the
nodes in the Bayesian network are processed one by one in a fashion of bottom-up
then top-down. With the information of segmentation, centroids and joint prob-
ability of parent nodes, the centroids of one node could be evaluated by applying
the deterministic relationship equation of that node and its parents and the con-
tinuous probability distribution of the node could be calculated. Then, the discrete
conditional probability of this node conditional on its parents can be derived by inte-
grating over each interval of this node along the continuous probability distribution
of every set of combination of intervals of all its parents [41].
Marginalization: In this final step of the process, marginalization theory is applied
to remove unnecessary variable in the joint probability. For example, if the joint
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Figure 3.3: A four-time-slice Bayesian net
P(B,C) by marginalizing P(A,B,C) over A. Zhong et al [41] presented a detailed
flow chart of the process and the results of their experiment.
3.2.2 Dynamic Bayesian Network Model
Dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) is a series of Bayesian belief networks which
is expanded over the time. Each discrete time stamp for a unit of time is known as
time slice. Different time slices are linked by arcs that are responsible for capturing
the evolution of the probabilities of variables with time. The arcs between the
time slices are similar to the arcs inside the BN, therefore the DBN itself is a BN.
Consequently, the same BN rules apply to DBN and same properties and inference
engines can be used.
Figure 3.3 shows an example of a model that repeats four times and Figure 3.4
shows a time slice for this model. These are simple examples in which the time slices
are identical and the temporal links are the same for different time slices. In a case
that in addition to the states, the conditional probabilities are also identical, then






Figure 3.4: One time slice of a four-time-slice Bayesian net
There are many inference engines for different types of DBNs; some perform
exact inference, while others approximate the results. Approximate inference is
used where exact inference method cannot be developed or exact inference is not
efficient. The exact inference allows estimating the final probability distribution of
the non-observed variables given the evidence in any order. This property of the
exact algorithms lets the fusion system developed over an exact inference algorithm
estimate the state of non-observed variables given out-of-sequence measurements
and so update the state of variables as soon as any piece of information becomes
available [43].
3.2.3 Information Metric
Information metric is defined as a scale to measure the amount of reliability
information. Its domain is a set of real numbers on the chosen scale such as value
of information, entropy, etc.
As decision makers, we are interested in making the best possible decisions
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given the model in hand. The information metrics are represented by functions that
are chosen by decision makers and each information metric associates a value with
each configuration of its domain variables. The goal of this analysis is to identify
the decision option (or the value of information metric) that produces the highest
value of reliability information. In other words, the information metric translates
the amount of reliability information to a numerical value.
Examples of information metric for an unknown of interest θ include:
UI(θ) = ∑
j






The information metric function presented in Equation 3.3 describes the amount
of information similar to entropy also known as Shannon information [44]. Entropy
is one of the fundamental measures of probability distribution. Entropy is the un-
certainty associated with a probability distribution which gives a measure of the
descriptive complexity of a probability distribution function (PDF). The relevance
of this choice for information metric function is that in decision making process, the
main reason for acquiring additional information is to decrease uncertainty about a
hypothesis.
Selecting information metric function is assumed to be at the discretion of the
decision maker, considering the problem domain. In decision making process, the
main reason for acquiring additional reliability information is to decrease uncertainty
about a hypothesis. Equation 3.4 measures the (inverse of) spread of information.
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Jackson [7] used one version of this equation. In this research, Equation 3.4 is con-
sidered as the framework for information metric function of choice. Given that the
information metric function is based on uncertainty about the unknowns of inter-
est, we select an information metric function that takes into account all unknowns
of interest relevant parameters which in this case is the probability of failure the
lower level components. It is important to mention that even though Equation 3.4
was used in this research, it should not be interpreted as the best function for in-
formation metric for other sensor placement problems. For example if the system
being analyzed has extremely reliable elements, perhaps σ in Equation 3.4 can be
exchanged with σ/µ.
3.3 Overview of Methodology
The Bayesian sensor placement (BSP) algorithms utilize Bayesian networks
for modeling, updating and reasoning the causal relationships and uncertainties
as well as for updating the state of knowledge for unknowns of interest (UOI) as
they are defined by: failure probabilities of lower level components, subsystems
or system; value of parameters; and the probability of physical parameters taking
specific values. “Information metrics” are used to assess the amount of information
each sensor placement scenario provides and the results are used to select sensor
placement scenario that provides the highest amount of information.
The process starts with identifying the system functional failure modes and
failure mechanisms and relevant stress models. A logic diagram (e.g. fault tree) is
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chosen to represent the logical relationships among the components and subsystems
within a complex system. A Bayesian network of the system is then constructed,
and through engineering considerations, several potential sensor placement scenarios
are identified. Lastly, the value of “information metrics” are used to compare the
amount of information among sensor placement scenarios.
The proposed system health monitoring algorithm, utilizes the results of Bayesian
sensor placement for both prognosis and diagnosis of systems. This process starts
by sensors detecting the physical phenomena and translates to component states.
Based on each variable instantiation, the Bayesian network provides the probability
of failure for any point (node) of interest on system’s Bayesian network. This process
can be repeated through consecutive time steps for a continuous health assessment.
3.3.1 Description of BSP Algorithms
As mentioned earlier, after identifying the system functional failure modes
and failure mechanisms and relevant stress models, we build a fault tree (or other
preferred logic diagram) of the system. The next step is building the Bayesian
network of the system, however, one might suggest that the Bayesian network could
be constructed directly without building a fault tree. The reasons behind building
a fault tree before constructing the Bayesian network for this application are:
• The fault trees are the best graphical representations of a system to show how
the failures occur. On the other hand, even though Bayesian networks provide
representations similar to the system operation, some of the abstract failures
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such as human errors [45] may be overlooked.
• Fault trees are built based on engineering considerations and principles used
by engineers. Therefore, as a risk and reliability engineer, fault trees would be
the first choice for identifying failure events 1.
Assuming the fault tree of the system is built, the next step is the construction
of the system’s Bayesian network. The Bayesian sensor placement (BSP) algorithms
utilize Bayesian networks for modeling, updating and reasoning the causal relation-
ships and uncertainties as well as for updating the state of knowledge for unknowns
of interest (UOI). This involves three major steps [40]. First the set of relevant vari-
ables and their possible values need to be identified. Second, the graphical network is
drawn and the variables are connected through acyclic directed graph (DAG). This
step is also known as defining the network’s edges. The last step in constructing
the Bayesian network is defining the conditional probability tables (CPT). The ob-
jectivity of this step might vary for different problems, however, for some networks,
the CPTs can be determined directly from the system and for others, CPTs might
be based on subjective beliefs [40]. In some other cases, CPTs may be estimated
from historical data.
To illustrate how Bayesian networks are utilized in BSP algorithms, we present
the concept through a simple Bayesian network as shown in Figure 3.5. This figure
shows the inference engine building blocks of a simple three-node Bayesian network
in which pti is the “true” value of element i probability of failure and p
a
i is its “as-











Figure 3.5: Inference engine building blocks
sessed” value. Each “element” in Figure 3.5 can represent a component, subsystem
or system. We define “true” value as the distribution of pi as we know it (assum-
ing prior knowledge), and “assessed” value is the distribution of pi through the
sensory mechanisms we utilize. Obviously, the difference between the “true” value
and “assessed” value of the same element will be in various uncertainties including
uncertainties associated with the value of parameters, accuracy of sensors, state
of components (which they have their own distributions), and the uncertainties on
physical parameters. In addition, we define pis (probability of failure of element i)
as the “unknowns of interest” (UOI) which will be discussed in details in Section
4.5.1.
Assuming that we are interested in assessing the health of this three-node
system, the goal is to place sensor(s) to maximize the amount of information ob-
tained from the system as assess values. To perform this “placement” process, we
consider several potential sensor placement scenarios, calculate the value of “infor-
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mation metric” function for each scenario to identify the sensor placement scenario
that provides the highest amount of reliability information. The next section, de-
fines how the Bayesian network performs the inference and defines the “inputs” and
outputs of the system Bayesian network.
3.3.1.1 Overview of Inference Engine
One of the primary objectives of the Bayesian inference application is com-
bining the knowledge about a parameter with new observations to update the belief
about the value of the parameter. This can be interpreted in various ways, among
them is revising the level of uncertainties of a model’s parameters. In Bayesian
analysis, parameters follow a probability distribution and the knowledge about this
distribution is typically summarized in prior distribution of unknowns of interest
(UOI). Often a prior reflects a hypothesis about the nature of parameters or mod-
eling assumptions. In other situations, the existing knowledge may be difficult to
summarize as an informative prior.
The developed inference engine has three major blocks as shown in Figure
3.6. The first one is the input block, which deals with prior information and how it
is processed before entering the Bayesian network model. First, all prior informa-
tion related to environmental physical data such as temperature, relative humidity,
pressure, etc. for the lower level components are gathered. Then, considering the
functional failure modes, failure mechanisms, and physics of failure of the lower level

















































Figure 3.6: Inference engine block diagram
1′s and 0′s).
Figure 3.7 presents the input block of Figure 3.6 in more details. The output
of this block is the components state vectors which will be defined in more details
in the following sections.
The Bayesian network of the system, makes up the next block which is the
heart of the inference engine of Figure 3.6. The Bayesian network contains the
information on relations among the elements, functional relations between systems
and their elements (components, subsystems, etc.), and their probabilities. The
inputs of the Bayesian network are components state vectors which will be discussed
in Section 3.3.1.2 and the outputs are Sensor Information Vectors (SIV) which will
be discussed in Section 3.3.1.3 and shown as the last block in inference engine block
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Figure 3.7: Inference engine input block
3.3.1.2 Components State Vectors
All possible combinations of inputs’ states are defined as components state
vectors and presented as
x̃ = {x1, x2, . . . , xj, . . . , xn}, (3.5)
where n is the number of all possible arrangements of combinations and xj is the
vector of jth arrangement.
A k-state system with L lower level components, generates kL vectors in com-
ponents state vector. In other words components state vectors are defined for multi-
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state status. For simplicity, binary states are shown as example in Figure 3.7. An-
other example of a multi-state system could be a case when the states are defined
as “working”, “degraded”, and “not working”. In that case, the components state
vectors will grow larger, i.e. 33 instead of 23 for the three-input case of Figure 3.6
and Figure 3.7. As for the inference by the Bayesian network, the Bayesian network
will be instantiated at various probability of failures (related to each state) for each
input node instead of being instantiated at only “0” or “1” at each node for the
“working” or “not working” state.
3.3.1.3 Sensor Information Vectors (SIV)
Sensor information vectors (SIV) are defined as the set of states detected by
sensors and presented as
SIV ∶ x̃s = {xs1, xs2, . . . , xsi , . . . , xsm}, (3.6)
where xsi is the vector representing the i
th set of sensors’ states, out of m combina-
tions of states detected by the set of sensors. For the network shown in Figure 3.6
with three potential sensors detecting binary states, the SIV may have up to eight
elements. However, it is important to mention that depending on the possible range
of physical phenomena (inputs to Bayesian network), some output combinations
(SIV elements) may not occur and that is why we state that SIV may have “up to”
2m elements assuming m potential sensor places and binary states.
Given that the Bayesian network’s “outputs” are recorded only where the
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sensors were placed, the SIV represents the outputs of the Bayesian network to
components state vectors only at those nodes that we placed the sensors.
In addition, it is important to note that the Bayesian network updates the
state of knowledge after receiving new information and these updates are avail-
able throughout the Bayesian network, even though we are only monitoring the
nodes where sensors are placed. This shows one of the most important strengths of
Bayesian network which we will utilize in a new system health monitoring described
in details in Chapter 7.
3.3.1.4 Placement Process
Ideally, a system’s reliability information can be obtained through the place-
ment of sensors in various places of the system. However, in many applications,
due to physical, technological or resource limitations, one may not be able to place
sensors where they are needed the most. Therefore, as decision makers, we have
to decide where would be the most optimum places to install the sensors to obtain
the maximum amount of reliability information, given the constraints. We start
this phase of the BSP, by selecting multiple sensor placement arrangements and
we called them “sensor placement scenarios”. Our goal is to identify which sensor
placement scenario would provide the maximum amount of reliability information
when comparing the selected scenarios.
This process starts with identifying the lower level components and defining
the components state vectors as described in Section 3.3.1.2. In the next step, we
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define the sensor information vectors (Section 3.3.1.3) for each sensor placement
scenario and utilizing Monte Carlo simulations method as will be discussed in de-
tails in Chapter 5, numerous evidence sets will be generated and used to calculate
the value of the information metric function (Section 3.2.3) associated with each
sensor placement scenario. The sensor placement scenario with the highest value of
information metric represents the “optimum” sensor placement scenario.
The next section presents how this optimum sensor placement methodology
can be used to build an efficient health monitoring system.
3.3.2 Description of the Proposed Health Monitoring System
System health monitoring can ease the maintenance difficulties by replacing a
regular / scheduled maintenance with a planned maintenance and provide relief in
schedule and cost saving by eliminating unnecessary maintenance and shut downs.
Similar concerns exist for newly designed systems as well. System health monitoring
assesses the state of a system’s health and through appropriate data processing and
interpretation, can predict the remaining life of the system.
The framework for the proposed Bayesian system health monitoring concept
is shown in Figure 3.8. For this single sensor system, the sensor detects the physical
phenomena and through an algorithm which takes into account the failure modes,
failure mechanisms, physics of failure and various standards and codes, and trans-
lates the physical phenomena to component states as shown in Figure 3.7. The
states are then fed to the Bayesian network of the system to be monitored. The
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Figure 3.8: Schematic diagram of the proposed system health monitoring concept
Bayesian network provides the probability of failure for subsystem of interest as
well as probability of failure at system level based on that specific instantiation
(also called a truth assignment, a variable assignment, or a variable instantiation).
This provides a snapshot of system health (or the complement of the probability of
failure) based on one observation.
This process can be expanded to multiple sensors for more precise estimates.
The process can also be set up as a dynamic monitoring system such that through
consecutive time steps, the system sensors perform observations and send data to
the Bayesian network for continuous health assessment. This makes the Bayesian
network, a dynamic Bayesian network. We will discuss this methodology and its
development details in Chapter 7.
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3.4 Summary
This chapter provided the key building blocks of the proposed Bayesian sensor
placement (BSP) methodology. It started with the description of Bayesian belief
networks, dynamic Bayesian networks, and few definitions such as “information
metric” and “value of reliability information”. Then it followed by an overview
of the proposed methodology including a description of Bayesian sensor placement,
the proposed inference engine, and additional definitions such as “state vectors” and
“sensor information vector”. The chapter ended with an overview of the proposed
system health monitoring.
Chapter 4 will discuss the inference model constructions in details and a case
study will be presented as a running example as the methodology is developed.
Chapter 5 will continue on the same case study and provides the details of the





This chapter presents the details of inference model construction that will be
used for sensor placement process. The steps of model construction are presented
using a simple case study of a power transformer. This chapter starts with back-
ground information on major components of a power transformer, continues with the
description of their functional failure modes and failure mechanisms. It also presents
a brief summary of Physics of Failure (PoF) concept; then presents associated stress
models and life, related to this case study. This chapter also presents the Bayesian
network of the case study system, unknowns of interest (being failure probabilities
of lower level components, subsystems or system), inputs, outputs, potential sensor
locations and sensor types.
4.2 Example System Overview
Transformers make the electric power systems operate more efficiently. They
step the voltage up so that more power can be transmitted efficiently at longer
distance. Power transformers operate at both transmission and distribution levels.
They step the voltage down for use in commercial and industrial facilities as well as
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Figure 4.1: A typical power transformer
residences to a level at which the equipment and appliances operate.
Power transformers operate in series with generation, transmission and dis-
tribution equipment and consequently, in most cases, are considered a single point
of failure. Therefore, their reliability and availability have major effect in overall
power system operation. In this case study, we introduce an all-inclusive system
health monitoring concept for power transformers and present our Bayesian sensor
placement methodology.
The following sections start with background information on functional failure
modes and failure mechanisms on major components of a power transformer. Then
follows with a brief summary of Physics of Failure (PoF) concept. Then associated
stress models and life related to this case study are presented. This section also
presents the Bayesian network of the case study system, its specific inputs, outputs,
potential sensor locations and sensor types.
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4.2.1 Functional Failure Modes
Figure 4.2 shows the fault tree for a typical power transformer and Figure
4.3 present its equivalent Bayesian network. The failure modes for each major sub-
component within a power transformer are presented as follows [46].
Tank. The transformer tank is primarily a container of the oil. In addition, it
provides physical protection for the active parts of the transformer. It also serves as
a support structure for auxiliaries and control equipment. The transformer tank is
made of sheet metal and is subject to both environmental effect as well as internal
stress. Tank’s failure can be described as any condition that it either cannot hold
the oil (leak) or degraded structurally.
Corrosive atmosphere, high humidity and sun can accelerate tanks aging. In-
ternal fault (arc) and lightning, vaporize the oil and increase the tank pressure which
may cause the tank to rupture.
Core. The core’s primary function is to carry the magnetic flux; and its failure
mode is reducing transformer’s efficiency. Manufacturing flaws, mechanical damage
due to fault or during shipping, and core steel displacement are among the major
causes of core malfunctions.
Winding. Transformer windings carry the current and typically are wound around









































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.3: Power transformer Bayesian belief network
and are usually insulated from each other through layers of oil impregnated insu-
lation papers. Windings have to withstand dielectric stress, thermal stress as well
as mechanical forces of magnetic fields. Short circuits and lightning may impose
significant forces on transformer windings.
Insulation Paper. The insulation paper in transformers is made of cellulose and
its main function is providing dielectric and mechanical isolation to the windings.
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Cellulose is made of long chains of glucose rings. When cellulose degrades, these
chains get shorter. The condition of these papers is measured in degree of poly-
merization (DP) which is the average number of rings in a chain. A new paper has
DP value of around 1,400. A DP value of 200 or less indicates poor mechanical
strength and may not withstand short circuit and similar mechanical forces. Heat,
moisture and various gases (in oil) are among the major causes of insulation paper
degradation and eventually failure [47], [48].
There are several ways to mitigate insulation paper degradation. One is re-
moving the oil, filtering it and placing it back to the tank. The filter can remove
significant amount of gas (i.e. oxygen) and water. The other solution is completely
replacing the oil.
Oil. The transformer oil is a highly refined product from mineral and crude oil
and consists of hydrocarbon composition of which the most common are paraffin,
naphthene and other mineral oils. The oil serves as both a cooling medium as well
as insulation. The major causes of oil degradation are oxygen, humidity and solid
objects.
As part of transformers insulation system, the oil keeps the insulation paper
saturated with oil and also provides insulation between parts of components within
the tank. Degradation in oil quality will increase the chance of internal short circuit.
To keep the oil quality at an acceptable level, the oil needs to be regularly tested.
When test results show degradation, either the oil needs to be removed and filtered
or completely replaced.
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Fans. Most power transformers are equipped with fans. Their function is to keep
the transformer at proper temperature. They are usually packaged in groups and
most of the transformers are equipped with redundant fans which make them non-
critical components of the transformers.
Bushings. The function of bushings is to prevent flash over between transformer
winding end and wires that connect the transformer to the network. Bushings are
mainly made of insulated materials such as ceramic, and are typically filled with oil.
The main failure mode of bushings is short circuiting. This could happen
through the degradation of bushing material, dust and humidity on the outside of
bushing, or physical damage either through natural disaster or during shipping.
4.2.2 Failure Mechanisms
Transformers are subject to thermal, mechanical, chemical and electrical stresses.
The following sections describe more details on adverse effect of each stress on trans-
former sub-components and suggest potential monitoring points for each component.
Thermal Stress. In a power transformer, tank, windings, core, oil, control panels
and bushings are subject to thermal stress. Temperature’s adverse effects on trans-
formers include high steady state temperature, temperature range, temperature
cycles, spatial temperature gradients, temperature ramp rates and heat dissipation.
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Potential monitoring points include ambient temperature, tank temperature,
oil temperature and windings temperature.
Mechanical Stress. Mechanical stress caused by pressure magnitude, pressure gra-
dient, vibration, shock load, acoustic level, strain and stress may have fatal effects
on transformers. High pressure within the tank can cause the tank to rupture. Vi-
bration can damage core structure, bushings and electronic and control equipment.
Shocks during transportation can cause structural and physical damage. High noise
level can interfere with control and communication systems. In addition, stress and
strain can damage the tank too.
Potential monitoring points include tank pressure, tank vibration, noise level
within a few inches from tank, strain sensor on the outside of the tank, shear stress
sensor on the outside of the tank, and shock recorders on transformer crate during
the transportation.
Chemical Stress. Chemical stress such as chemical aggressive versus inert environ-
ment, humidity level, contamination, ozone, pollution and fuel spills can contribute
to transformers failures. High humidity and pollutant can accelerate tank corrosion
which in turn cause oil leak and short circuit. Pollutant and humidity can also cause
flash over on bushings. And fuel spills can cause fire.
Potential monitoring points include ambient humidity and leak sensor.


















Figure 4.4: Partial fault tree of power transformer
tribute to transformers failure. Lightning on transmission lines can instantly move
to transformer windings and put a very high voltage stress, beyond the transformer
insulation level, and cause short circuit. A major short circuit inside or outside the
transformer can cause significant amount of current passing through the windings.
Potential monitoring points include voltage, current, power, transient voltage,
and transient current.
4.3 Case Study - Partial Transformer System
In order to simplify the presentation of the developed methodology, a simplified
(partial) version of the power transformer is considered for our case study. Figure 4.4
presents a partial fault tree of the power transformer discussed earlier. Figure 4.5
shows the same fault tree with potential sensor locations and Figure 4.6 shows
























Figure 4.5: Potential sensor locations on transformer partial fault tree
partial fault tree and its equivalent Bayesian network are considered here to support
the steps of methodology. The following sections of this chapter provide these steps.
Chapter 5 presents the details of all the steps of sensor placement process for this
simple example.
4.4 Bayesian Network Model
The lower level components states are considered as inputs to the Bayesian
network. For this case study, the state of “Gas in Oil”, “Humidity (moisture) in Oil”
and “Heat (transformer temperature)” represent the three inputs in the Bayesian
network model. Figure 4.7 presents how the inputs are fed into the Bayesian net-
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Figure 4.6: Bayesian network of power transformer partial fault tree
work. For this case study, the three inputs are as follows.
Input-1: Gas in Oil. The insulation paper in transformers is made of cellulose and
its main function is providing dielectric and mechanical isolation to the windings.
According to standard ASTM D-2945, maximum total gas content of transformer
oil shall not be more than 1.0%.
Input-2: Moisture in Oil. Moisture in oil significantly degrade the insulation
characteristics of oil. Many references including NETA (www.netaworld.org) pro-
vide a generally accepted maximum moisture content of 35 ppm for mineral oil.
Moisture content of oil is controlled by relative humidity and typically when mon-
itored (or tested) the relative humidity is measured. Water in Oil Solubility as a
function of temperature can be expressed as



















Figure 4.7: Bayesian network inputs and outputs
where So is the solubility of water in mineral oil.
Relative Saturation (RS) is the actual amount of water measured in oil in
relation to solubility at certain temperature.
RS(%) =Wc/So (4.2)
where Wc is the water content (moisture) in oil (ppm) for various temperatures.
Input-3: Heat. IEEE Std. C57.91-1995, the Guide for Loading Mineral-Oil-
Immersed Transformers, provides calculation methodology to measure oil and wind-
ing temperatures. An industry accepted methodology for calculating transformers
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top-oil temperature rise is given by
TO2 = TO1(i2/i1)1.8 (4.3)
where TO2 is the ultimate top-oil rise, TO1 is the initial or known top-oil rise, and
i2/i1 is the per-unit current loading.
For this case study, we assume that oil temperature has been directly mea-
sured through oil immersed temperature sensors.
Inputs vs. Sensor Readings Inputs in our model represent the set of historical
data that is assumed will be available from the system site. While the sensor read-
ings are referred to those data sets that will be generated through the detection of
physical phenomena by proposed sensors.
Considering Sensor Uncertainty For simple cases of sensors with known per-
centage of error, the amount of inaccuracy is included in the Bayesian network model
by adding an extra node for each sensor.
4.4.1 Physics of Failure (PoF) Analysis
Physics of failure analysis is an approach to design, reliability assessment,
testing, screening and stress margins assessment. It uses knowledge of root-cause
failure processes to prevent product failures through robust design and manufactur-
ing practices which involves identification of potential failure mechanisms, failure
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sites, and failure modes; the appropriate failure models and their input parameters.
The objective of any physics of failure analysis is to determine or predict when a
specific end-of-life failure mechanism will occur for an individual component in a
specific application.
There are several areas of concern in conventional approaches (i.e. constant
failure rate) towards reliability analysis which physics of failure approach is attempt-
ing to address [49]. Among them are:
Zero Failure Criteria. Zero failure criteria is a case in which a reliability test
ends in zero units having failed. Traditional reliability calculations suggest that the
estimated failure rate is also zero, assuming an exponential distribution. Obviously,
this is not a realistic estimate of a failure rate, as it does not take into account the
number of units.
Single Failure Mechanisms vs. Competing Failure Mechanisms. Single
failure mechanisms vs. competing failure mechanisms refers to application of ac-
celerated life testing in cases with multiple failure mechanisms and compares them
with single failure mechanism. It also offers details on how to deal with multiple
failure mechanisms and provides detailed calculations.
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4.4.2 Stress Models and Life
Arrhenius Relationship. The Arrhenius life-stress model is a widely used model
describing the effect of heat on accelerating chemical reactions and it is probably
the most common life-stress relationship utilized in accelerated life testing. It is
derived from the Arrhenius reaction rate equation proposed by the Swedish physical
chemist Svandte Arrhenius in 1887 [50] and is given by
L(V ) = AeB/T (4.4)
where L is life, A and B are constants that depend on the aging rate and end-of-life
definition and T is the absolute temperature in Kelvins (○C+273).
Eyring Relationship. The Eyring relationship is another model used when ther-
mal stress (temperature) is the acceleration variable. However, the Eyring relation-
ship sometimes is used for stress variables other than temperature, such as humidity
[50].
Inverse Power Law (IPL) Relationship. The inverse power law (IPL) model is
commonly used for non-thermal stresses such as voltage and is given by
L(V ) = 1
K V n
(4.5)
where L represents a quantifiable life measure, such as mean life, characteristic life,
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median life, etc., V represents the stress level, K is one of the model parameters to
be determined, (K > 0), and n is another model parameter to be determined.
Temperature – Humidity Relationship.
The temperature – humidity (T-H) relationship is used for predicting the life at
use conditions when both temperature and humidity are considered as stress factors.
Temperature – Non-Thermal Relationship. When temperature and a second
non-thermal stress (such as voltage) are the stress factors, then the Arrhenius and
the inverse power law relationships can be combined to yield the temperature –






where U is the non-thermal stress (such as voltage, etc.), V is the temperature (in
absolute units), and B, C, and n are the parameters to be determined.
General Log-Linear Relationship. When in a system, multiple stress factors
exist, a general multivariable relationship such as general log-linear relationship
can describe the life characteristic as a function of a vector with n stresses, or
X = (X1,X2, ...,Xn). Mathematically the relationship is given by






where αjs are model parameters and X is a vector of n stresses.
4.5 Model Inputs and Outputs
In this section, we present details of model inputs and outputs and how they
interact with unknowns of interest.
4.5.1 Unknowns of Interest (UOI)
Failure probabilities of lower level components, subsystems or system; value
of parameters; and the probability of physical parameters taking specific values are
defined as unknowns of interest (UOI) for this case study. For example, in the
Bayesian network of power transformer partial fault tree as shown in Figure 4.6,
probabilities of gas in oil, humidity in oil, heat, oil failure, insulation paper failure
and system failure are considered unknowns of interest. For this case study, it
is assumed that we are interested in assessing the health of a system and have
already determined that three lower level components failure probabilities (gas in
oil, humidity in oil and heat) have major role in overall system health. However, due
to practical and resource limitations in physical placement and number of sensors,
it might be beneficial to assess the system health through limited number of sensors
in locations other than where health assessment is desired. This, presents the heart
of the Bayesian sensor placement (BSP) methodology which will be described in
detail in Chapter 5.
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4.5.2 Components State Vectors
As stated earlier, all possible combinations of inputs’ states are defined as
components state vectors, x̃ = {x1, x2, . . . , xj, . . . , xn}. For this case study with bi-
nary states and three lower level components (inputs to the Bayesian network), the
components state vectors x̃ will contain 23 = 8 elements.
The Bayesian network inputs (components state vectors) need to be in the form
of finite set of states (i.e. 1’s and 0’s) or as probabilities of success or failure, while
in real systems, the available inputs are physical phenomena such as temperature,
pressure, relative humidity, etc. Therefore, through an appropriate process, the
physical phenomena need to be converted to components states. Figure 3.7 presented
a general scheme for a typical process. Figure 4.8 presents the details of the process
for this case study.
The algorithms for the conversions utilize all the known physics of failure
related to each phenomenon, taking into account uncertainties, related standards,
functional failure modes and failure mechanisms to convert the sensory data for each
physical phenomenon to a component state.
The three buckets represent three data sets of physical phenomena to be con-
sidered as inputs to the case study system Bayesian network, which could be ob-
tained either from historical data or through testing. For example, historical oil
temperature data set may contain various temperature readings in degrees Cel-
sius. To assign a “state” to each data point, the failure modes, failure mechanisms,
physics of failure and various standards and codes related to transformer oil need to
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StateFailure Modes, Failure Mechanisms, 



















State x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Gas in Oil 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Hum in Oil 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0







Figure 4.8: Conceptual diagram for conversion of physical phenomena to compo-
nents states
be examined and translated in computer codes (conversion process in Figure 4.9) to
convert the temperature readings to components states. Similarly, other conversion
algorithms have been written to translate the percentage of gas in oil and humid-
ity in oil data sets to components states. As a result, this process generates the
components state vectors as presented in Figure 4.9.
This process assumes sampling each element of each state vector at a time. It
is also possible to consider sampling joint distribution of all elements (e.g. three)
of state vector at a time. In that case there will be one bucket filled with historical
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State x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Gas in Oil 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Hum in Oil 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Heat 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Oil 
for i=1:100






















Figure 4.9: Algorithm snapshot for conversion of physical phenomena to components
states
data sets with each set comprised of a pack of three points: a percentage of gas
in oil reading, an oil humidity percentage reading and a transformer temperature
reading.
4.5.3 Sensor Selection
Referring to Figure 4.7, three types of sensors for three locations (based on
the functional location on the logic diagram) have been proposed as follows:
Sensor-1. A HYDRAN-M2 sensor as shown in Figure 4.10 , monitors built up
gas in power transformer’s oil and for this case study, is considered as a candidate
for sensor -1 location. The HYDRAN-M2 sensor measures the level of combustible
gases in power transformer dielectric oil, which is important to be evaluated for
potential dangerous conditions, bubbling temperature and aging. M2 is sensitive to
four gases that are primary indicators of initial faults in oil-filled power transform-
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Figure 4.10: HYDRAN-M2 gas monitor (courtesy of General Electric Company)
ers: hydrogen, carbon monoxide, ethylene and acetylene.
Sensor-2. Kelman TRANSFIX (Dissolved Gas Analysis) and moisture sensor for
power transformers as shown in Figure 4.11 is considered for sensor-2 location. It has
configurable sampling rates from daily to hourly, uses photo-acoustic spectroscopy
for better detection results, and is equipped with full embedded processor which is
capable of storing over two years of data at its default sampling rate of one sample
taken every four hours.
Sensor-3. A typical voltmeter as shown in Figure 4.12, is considered for sensor-3
location. It is located on the secondary of the power transformer (through potential
transformers) to monitor whether the transformer is operational or not.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we presented the key building blocks of the inference model
construction for the proposed Bayesian sensor placement algorithms. The chapter
started with an overview of power transformers chosen as a case study system.
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Figure 4.11: Kelman TRANSFIX online DGA and moisture sensor (courtesy of
General Electric Company)
Figure 4.12: A typical analog voltmeter (courtesy of SiGMA ELECTRiK Company)
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Next, its functional failure modes, failure mechanisms, and physics of failures were
reviewed, followed by a summary of various stresses and stress and life models. A
sub-set of a typical power transformer (partial system) was considered as the case
study system. The rest of the chapter dealt with the details of building the Bayesian
inference model, selecting potential sensor types and locations, and building the
components state vectors and sensor information vectors. The next chapter describes
how these model elements are used to find the
sensor placement scenario that would provide the most of amount of reliability





We define Bayesian sensor placement (BSP) as a set of sensor placement sce-
narios and an information metric to measure the expected amount of reliability
information that each possible sensor placement scenario provides. This presents
the heart of a novel methodology for optimum sensor placement in a complex sys-
tem. Information metric is defined as a scale to measure the amount of information
each sensor placement scenario provides, and its domain is a set of real numbers that
can be interpreted directly as expected gains on the chosen scale such as amount of
information, entropy, etc. Potential applications of Bayesian sensor placement solu-
tions include health monitoring of a simple power system, an aircraft, or a complex
system.
This chapter presents the details of the proposed Bayesian sensor placement
process. The Bayesian sensor placement problem is defined by: (1) a set of candidate
sensor placement scenarios; (2) a measure of assessing the expected values associ-
ated with each sensor placement scenario, called “information metric”; and (3) a
comparison of the information metric values to determine which placement scenario
yields the highest expected information metric value. The sensor placement process
is presented for the case study of Chapter 4.
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5.2 Bayesian Sensor Placement Flow Chart
Figure 5.1 illustrates the flow chart of the proposed Bayesian sensor placement
process. To further explain the details of this sensor placement methodology, we
utilize a simplified form of the transformer example presented in the case study of
Chapter 4. Throughout this chapter, all the steps of the sensor placement process
are explained and in parallel, the transformer case study will be used as a running
example.
5.3 The Case Study Bayesian Sensor Placement Algorithm
It is assumed that we are interested in the failure status of three lower level
components, however, due to physical, technological or resource limitations, it is not
possible to place sensors at all three lower level components positions. Alternatively,
there are other potential places that sensors can be installed, and in specific, the
goal is to find the sensor placement scenario that would provide the most amount
of information about the health of the system. As discussed in Section 4.5.1, we
defined failure probabilities of lower level components, subsystems or system, value
of parameters, and the probability of physical parameters taking specific values as
unknowns of interest (UOI) in the proposed Bayesian sensor placement algorithms.
Considering the fault tree of Figure 4.5 and Bayesian network of Figure 4.6,
the goal is to find the sensor placement scenario providing the highest amount of
reliability information given that only two sensors can be utilized.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The overall transformer major functional failure modes include tank, core, winding,
insulation paper, oil, fans, bushings, heat exchangers, tap changers and auxiliary
equipment, however, the simplified version of the transformer fault tree in this case
study includes limited number of transformer parts. For this example, the system
functional failure modes include failures of bushings, oil, insulation paper, windings
and tank.
Step 2. Identify system failure mechanisms.
The system failure mechanisms include thermal stress, mechanical stress, chemical
stress and electrical stress.
Step 3. Identify relevant stress models.
Arrhenius life-stress model, Eyring relationship, inverse power law, temperature –
non-thermal relationship and general log-linear relationship are among the models
being considered for this example.
Note on Step 1 through 3. The main purpose of identifying system failure
modes, functional failure mechanisms, physics of failure and stress models is to be
able to translate the physical phenomena obtained from historical data, testing,
sampling and direct sensor readings, to “states”. As described in Section 3.3.1.1
and presented in Figure 3.7, the Bayesian network inputs need to be in the form of
finite set of states (i.e. 1’s and 0’s) or as probabilities of success or failure, while
in real systems, the available inputs are physical phenomena such as temperature,
pressure, relative humidity, etc.
Step 4. Choose a logic diagram to present the system.
A fault tree is the chosen logic diagram and it is presented in Figure 4.5. As discussed
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earlier, the hallmark of the proposed Bayesian sensor placement is its capability in
finding sensor locations on system’s logic diagram (i.e. its fault tree) that would
provide the highest amount of reliability information.
Step 5. Construct the Bayesian network (BN) of the system.
The system Bayesian network is presented in Figure 4.6. In this process, system
Bayesian network is utilized for modeling and reasoning the causal relationships and
uncertainties as well as for updating the state of knowledge for unknowns of interest.
There are various approaches in building Bayesian networks. The most fre-
quently used methods in building Bayesian networks are: (1) based on expert knowl-
edge, (2) based on system design, and (3) by learning from historical data. For the
proposed Bayesian sensor placement algorithm, we utilize a combination of these
methodologies. In specific, we followed three basic steps to fully specify the sys-
tem’s Bayesian network:
First, we identified the variables with the most impact on system health. Typi-
cally, these variables are the nodes associated with the lower level components which
their failure would propagate through the subsystems and eventually to the system
level (top event). We labeled these variables as the lower level components. In sep-
arate efforts, we tried to collect historical data related to any / all of the lower level
components and the goal was to use those historical data sets to train the Bayesian
network.
Second, we identified the network’s structure through defining the edges be-
tween the nodes. The system logic diagram (fault tree in this case study) was used
to identify the correlations among network nodes.
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Third, we combined our knowledge of network variables, network structure and
engineering experience to define the relationships among the nodes and edges,in the
form of conditional probability tables (CPT).
Step 6. Identify the lower level components of the system (the inputs to BN).
The data sets with values of lower level components’ states are considered as inputs
to the Bayesian network. For this case study, the states of “Gas in Oil”, “Humidity
(moisture) in Oil” and “Heat (transformer temperature)” represent the three inputs
in Bayesian network.
Step 7. Identify potential sensor locations.
Three potential sensor sites as shown in Figure 5.2 are considered. They can monitor
system state (top level), transformer oil state, and potential gas in transformer oil.
Given that technically, sensors could be installed almost at any Bayesian net-
work node, however, due to physical, technological and financial restrictions, this
may not be possible. Therefore, as decision makers, we have to decide upon the sen-
sor placement scenarios to obtain the maximum amount of reliability information,
given the constraints.
Step 8. Identify sensor types.
A HYDRAN-M2 sensor as shown in Figure 4.10 , monitors built up gas in transform-
ers oil and is considered as a candidate for sensor -1 location. A Kelman TRANSFIX
online DGA (Dissolved Gas Analysis) and moisture sensor for transformers as shown
in Figure 4.11 is considered for sensor-2 location. A typical voltmeter as shown in
Figure 4.12, is considered for sensor-3 location.











Figure 5.2: Potential sensor location for the case study
Given that uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of sensors, therefore, what sen-
sors report may have some deviations from the actual physical phenomenon they
are monitoring. To capture this inconsistency, we modeled the uncertainties prob-
abilistically and updated the Bayesian network with these probabilities at sensor
locations. For this example, probabilistic uncertainty values associated with each
sensor was added to the example Bayesian network.
Step 9. Choose sensor placement scenarios.
Given the number of sensor types, the number of potential sensor locations and the
constraints for each sensor type, several combinations of sensor scenarios can be
generated. In general, assuming k1 is the potential number of sensor locations for
each sensor, k2 is the number of sensors are allowed for each sensor type, and j is




k2j! (k1j − k2j)!
(5.1)
When there is no specific constraints for each type of sensor, with three po-
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tential sensor locations and a constraint to utilize only two sensors (of any type),








where k1 is potential number of sensor locations and k2 represents the number of
sensors are allowed. We also added one additional scenario with three sensors just
to examine how a case with one additional sensor would stack up against the reset
of two-sensor scenarios. Therefore, the sensor placement scenarios are:
• Scenario 1: Utilize sensor 1, 2 and 3 (a test scenario)
• Scenario 2: Utilize sensor 1 and 3
• Scenario 3: Utilize sensor 2 and 3
• Scenario 4: Utilize sensor 1 and 2
and the sensor placement process goal is to evaluate which scenario provides the
highest amount of information assuming the system constraint is to use only two
sensors. In addition, it was assumed that even the sensor’s types are different,
however, the cost of sensors are the same and all sensors provide equal amount of
information.
Defining sensor scenarios is meant to structure a sensor placement process.
Additionally, we bring the “human factor” (in a positive way) into the decision
making process. Otherwise, we could use a computer generated set of various com-
binations of sensors, which for a large Bayesian network can be enormous. Instead,
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Table 5.1: The case study components state vectors
State Vector x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Gas in Oil 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Humidity 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Heat 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
as engineering experts (in this case study), we specifically chose certain combinations
of sensor placements (scenarios) that make engineering sense.
Step 10. Generate Component State Vectors.
All possible combinations of input states are defined as components state vectors
and presented as
x̃ = {x1, x2, . . . , xj, . . . , xn} (5.3)
for a system with n lower level components where xj is the jth set of input vector.
A k-state system with n lower level components generates kn vectors in compo-
nent state vector. For this example with three inputs, the components state vector
includes 23 = 8 vectors as shown in Table 5.1.
In Section 4.5.2, we discussed that in real world, the historical data sets are
measurements of physical phenomena such as degrees Celsius for temperature mea-
surement, etc., while the Bayesian network can be instantiated by states or prob-
abilities (success or failure). The process for this conversion was summarized in
Figure 4.8. We later called this process the “conversion process” for translating
physical phenomena to components states. In Step 10 of sensor placement pro-
cess, the Bayesian network is instantiated by all possible combinations of these
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components states to generate all possible sensor information vectors which will be
discussed next.
Step 11. Generate Sensor Information Vectors (SIV).
Sensor information vectors (SIV) is defined as the set of states detected by sensors
and presented as
SIV ∶ x̃s = {xs1, xs2, . . . , xsi , . . . , xsm} (5.4)
where xsi is the vector representing the i
th set of sensors states out of m combinations
of states detected by the set of sensors.
As described earlier, the case study inference engine has three major blocks as
shown in Figure 3.6. The input block represents the component state vectors, the
output block represents the sensor information vectors (SIV) and the middle block
is the Bayesian network. For sensor placement scenario 1 of this example with three
sensors detecting binary states, the SIV may have up to eight elements. The reason
behind the potential lesser number of SIV elements than mathematical combinations
of sensor points is that in reality, some combinations are almost impossible. The
proof comes at the end of process of generating SIV and realizing that the probability
of occurring certain SIV elements is zero. Table 5.4 shows the exact number of
vectors for this case study.
Figure 5.3 presents the detailed step by step of the process for inferring sensor
information vectors for scenario 1 of the case study.
Step 12. Choose an information metric.
Information metric is defined as a scale to measure the amount of reliability infor-
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Table 5.2: The case study sensor information vectors for scenario 1









Sensor 1 1 1 1 0 0
Sensor 2 1 0 0 1 1
Sensor 3 1 1 0 1 0
mation. Its domain is a set of real numbers on the chosen scale such as value of
information, entropy, etc.










For this case study, Equation 5.6 is considered as the framework for information
metric function of choice. Given that the information metric function is based on
uncertainty about the unknowns of interest, we select an information metric function
that takes into account all unknowns of interest relevant parameters which in this
case is the probability of failure the lower level components.
Step 13. Generate samples of unknowns of interest.
Monte Carlo simulation is used to randomly draw joint samples of states of the lower
level components.















State x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Oil 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Hum 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Heat 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
State SIV1 SIV2 SIV3 SIV4 SIV5 SIV6 SIV7 SIV8
S1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
S2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
S3 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Component State Vectors
Possible Sensor Information Vectors (SIV)
Figure 5.3: Sensor information vectors (SIV) inference details
Each randomly drawn set of unknown of interest defines the lower level components
states. Monte Carlo and Bootstrap simulation methods were utilized to draw joint
samples of three historical information (as shown schematically in three buckets in
Figure 4.8). Figure 5.4 shows the process of simulating components state vectors .
Assuming uniform distribution, first we randomly draw one data point from each
bucket of Figure 4.8, run them through the “conversion process” presented in Figure
4.8 and generate one data set (called state vector) which represents a set of lower
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....
Started with 100 input vectors
Ended up with 1000
input vectors
Figure 5.4: Monte Carlo simulation to simulate components state vectors
level components states. We repeat this process a large number of times to create a
large set of components state vectors. Given that we started with three individual
data sets (three buckets) and considering binary states, there are 23 = 8 possible
distinct state vectors that can be generated. In other words, the components state
vectors will have eight elements. Then by counting the numbers of each element
and dividing by the total components state vectors, the probability of occurrence of
each vector element is calculated and shown in Table 5.3.
These state vectors will be used as inputs to the Bayesian network. The next
step is to run all of these inputs through the Bayesian network and record the
network’s outputs, which we called them Sensor Information Vectors, and will be
discussed in the following section.
Step 15. Simulate sensor information vectors.
Each vector generated on the output of the state vector simulation process is fed to
the system’s Bayesian network which in turn, would generate corresponding output
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Table 5.3: The case study state vectors and their probabilities
State Vector x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Gas in Oil 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Humidity 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Heat 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Probability 0.002 0.014 0.024 0.096 0.023 0.100 0.109 0.629
Table 5.4: The case study SIV and associated probabilities for scenario 1









Sensor 1 1 1 1 0 0
Sensor 2 1 0 0 1 0
Sensor 3 1 1 0 1 0
Probability 0.01648 0.0241 0.0967 0.1230 0.7395
states. Each set of output states at suggested location of sensors on a logic diagram,
generates a set of vectors which as described earlier, are called sensor information
vectors (xsi ). The same process is repeated for all state vectors to generate system
sensor information vectors (x̃s) for each sensor placement scenario. Tables 5.4 and
5.5 present the sensor information vectors for Scenario 1 and 2 for the case study.
Similar process was repeated for sensor placement scenarios 3 and 4 to generate
their sensor information vectors.
Step 16. Simulate evidence.
Starting with the sensor information vectors of Table 5.4 and utilizing Monte Carlo
simulation 100,000 times and assuming 4 demands each time, a large set of evidence
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Table 5.5: The case study SIV and associated probabilities for scenario 2







Sensor 1 1 1 0 0
Sensor 3 1 0 1 0
Probability 0.04175 0.09340 0.14395 0.72087
sets were generated. Figure 5.5 presents an overview of the process for generating
these evidence sets.
Step 17. Compute information metric function values for selected evidence sets.
Figure 5.6 presents the roadmap for calculating information metric function values
for each evidence set.
The process starts with component state vectors that are fed to the Bayesian
network. The Bayesian network outputs generate the sensor information vectors.
Running the SIV through the process of generating evidence sets as shown in Fig-
ure 5.5, generates a large number of evidence sets. Starting with the first evidence
set, here are the steps to calculate the information metric function value for the first
evidence set of the first sensor placement scenario:
a. Instantiate the Bayesian network at sensor nodes with the values of the first
element of evidence set (0 0 0 as shown in Figure 5.6) and record the values of
unknowns of interest which are the failure probabilities at the lower level components
in system’s Bayesian network. These values were calculated as p1 = 0, p2 = 0.0362,
and p3 = 0.0247, where p1 is the probability of presence of gas in oil, p2 is the
probability of presence of humidity in oil, and p3 is the probability of transformer
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SIV: 1,000 Data Points

















.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Figure 5.5: Procedure for generating evidence sets
overheating, all for the the first line of evidence set #1 of scenario 1 of sensor
placement scenarios.
b. Repeat step a. for the other three elements of evidence set #1.
c. Calculate σ2p1 for four p1 values calculated in previous steps.
d. Repeat step c for p2 and p3.
e. Calculate 1/σ2p1 , 1/σ2p2 , and 1/σ2p3 and add them up. This value (13333560.62)
will be recorded as the information metric function value associated with the first
evidence set of sensor placement scenario 1. Record this value under “Information
Metric (Ui)” in the table shown in top part of Figure 5.6. Also see Figure 5.7 for
the details of this analysis.





State x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Gas 
in Oil 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Hum 
in Oil 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Heat 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
P(sv) 0.002 0.014 0.024 0.096 0.023 0.100 0.109 0.629
State SIV1 SIV2 SIV3 SIV4 SIV5
S-1 1 1 1 0 0
S-2 1 0 0 1 0










Calculate the information metric value for the first evidence in Case 1
Evidence set #1
P(Evidence set #1) = 0.1440 









Number of Observed Failures in Each 




Sensor 1 Sensor 2 Sensor 3
1 0.1440 2 2 2 13333560




0      0      0
0      0      0
1      1      1
1      1      1
SIV1 SIV2 SIV3 SIV4 SIV5
P(SIV) 0.016 0.024 0.096 0.123 0.739
Figure 5.6: Roadmap for calculating information metric function values for each
evidence set
of times it appeared in the pool of evidence sets and dividing by the total number of
evidence sets. Record this number under “Approximate Probability of Evidence Set
(Prev(i))” column for evidence set #1 in the table shown in top part of Figure 5.6.
A similar process is repeated for the rest of evidence sets and the information
metric function values associated with individual evidence sets for scenario 1 are
presented in Table 5.6.
The expected information metric function value for scenario 1 can be calculated
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Evidence set #1
0      0      0
0      0      0
1      1      1












SIV5 0 0.0362 0.0247
SIV5 0 0.0362 0.0247
SIV1 1 0.1582 0.0252
SIV1 1 0.1582 0.0252
VAR 0.3 0.004465 7.5E-08
1/VAR 3.333333 223.9541 13333333




















Ui ⋅Prev(i) = 0.1440 × 1333 × 104 + 0.1296 × 9.7 × 104 +⋯ = 882 × 104. (5.7)
Table 5.7 presents the information metric function values associated with in-
dividual evidence sets for scenario 2 and the expected information metric value of
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Table 5.6: Most probable evidence sets - case study scenario 1
Evid. Apprx. Prob. Number of Observed Failures in Each Info.
Sets of Evid. Set Evidences Set Based on 4 Demands Metric
(i) (Prev(i)) Sensor 1 Sensor 2 Sensor 3 UI
1 0.1440 2 2 2 1333 ×104
2 0.1296 2 1 2 9.7 ×104
3 0.1264 2 2 1 1492 ×104
4 0.1243 1 2 2 1333 ×104
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯
scenario 2 can be calculated by
U I(2) =∑
i
Ui ⋅Prev(i) = 0.14204×8.5946×104+0.09348×11.4587×104+⋯ = 5.37×104.
(5.8)
Table 5.8 presents the information metric function values associated with in-
dividual evidence sets for scenario 3 and the expected information metric value of
scenario 3 can be calculated by
U I(3) =∑
i
Ui ⋅Prev(i) = 0.14348×1200×104+0.09608×1200×104+⋯ = 539.7×104. (5.9)
Finally, Table 5.9 presents the information metric function values associated
with individual evidence sets for scenario 3 and the expected information metric
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Table 5.7: Most probable evidence sets - case study scenario 2
Evid. Apprx. Prob. Number of Observed Failures in Each Info.
Sets of Evid. Set Evidences Set Based on 4 Demands Metric
(i) (Prev(i)) Sensor 1 Sensor 2 Sensor 3 UI
1 0.14204 2 - 2 8.5 ×104
2 0.09348 2 - 1 11.4×104
3 0.09344 3 - 2 8.5 ×104
4 0.09152 1 - 2 7.0 ×104
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ - ⋯ ⋯
Table 5.8: Most probable evidence sets - case study scenario 3
Evid. Apprx. Prob. Number of Observed Failures in Each Info.
Sets of Evid. Set Evidences Set Based on 4 Demands Metric
(i) (Prev(i)) Sensor 1 Sensor 2 Sensor 3 UI
1 0.14348 - 2 2 1200×104
2 0.09608 - 3 2 1200×104
3 0.0918 - 1 2 7.6×104
4 0.09156 - 2 1 1600×104
⋯ ⋯ - ⋯ ⋯ ⋯
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Table 5.9: Most probable evidence sets - case study scenario 4
Evid. Apprx. Prob. Number of Observed Failures in Each Info.
Sets of Evid. Set Evidences Set Based on 4 Demands Metric
(i) (Prev(i)) Sensor 1 Sensor 2 Sensor 3 UI
1 0.1443 2 2 - 208
2 0.0970 2 3 - 7636
3 0.0951 2 1 - 277
4 0.0934 3 2 - 209
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ - ⋯
function value of scenario 3 can be calculated by
U I(4) =∑
i
Ui ⋅ Prev(i) = 0.1443 × 208 + 0.0970 × 7636 +⋯ = 0.08 × 104. (5.10)
Step 18. Given the constraints, choose the optimum sensor placement scenario.
The results are summarized in Table 5.10. Reviewing the information metric values
associated with each sensor placement scenario, we see that the first scenario with
three sensors being utilized would provide the highest amount of information, which
is also a rational conclusion. Now, should we have a constraint to choose only two
places for sensors, this table can be used as a selection tool to compare scenarios
2 through 4 and conclude that scenario 4 with sensors placed in location 1 and 2
would provide the highest amount of information; therefore, it would be considered
the optimum sensor placement scenario.
Step 19. Is multi-sensor data fusion required?
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Table 5.10: The case study Bayesian sensor placement
Scenario Sensors Utilization Expected Info. Metric
1 Sensors 1, 2 and 3 882 × 104
2 Sensors 1 and 3 5.37 × 104
3 Sensors 2 and 3 539 × 104
4 Sensors 1 and 2 0.08 × 104
Multi-sensor data fusion is assumed not to be required.
This will conclude the sensor placement process by selecting scenario 4 with
sensors placed in location 1 and 2.
5.4 Case with No Historical Data
In case when historical data is not available, an alternate method is required
to build the components state vectors. From analytical stand point, this condition
would leave the Bayesian network of the algorithm without an informative prior.
For these cases, we use noninformative distributions for lower level components
state distributions.
There are a number of methodologies for developing noninformative prior dis-
tributions, and the most common one is called “Jeffreys’ rule”. Other techniques
include “histogram method” and “prior estimates of moments” [19].
For Bayesian sensor placement algorithms with no prior data, we introduce
a new methodology and call it “maximum range prior”. This is essentially a flat
prior which contains the entire possible range of each lower level component state
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and incorporate them as inputs to the algorithm of Bayesian network. To generate
the component state vectors when no historical data is available, the following steps
should be taken:
• Select the potential lower level components that their historical data is not
available.
• Identify the possible range of the input.
• Through the previously presented conversion process (Figure 4.8), translate
physical phenomena to “states”.
• Continue the placement process as presented in the flow chart of Figure 5.1
Figure 5.8 summarizes the above steps in a simple graphical representation
for the transformer oil temperature of the case study example presented earlier. It
shows the possible range of temperature variations and how it is divided to three
areas: functional (acceptable), degraded (marginally accepted), and failed. These
three states were translated to states 1, 1 and 0 respectively.
In a separate analysis for the transformer system case study example that was
presented in this chapter, we assumed that no historical data was available for any
of the three lower level components and re-ran the entire Bayesian sensor place-
ment algorithm using the “maximum range prior” method to generate component
state vectors. The results confirmed that even without historical data, the sensor

























Figure 5.8: Component states for case with no historical data
5.5 Scalability Analysis
The scalability of a protocol or process is defined as its ability to support
the increase of system limiting parameters without degrading performance. An
important aspect of Bayesian sensor placement performance analysis is the study
of how the algorithm performance varies with parameters such as fault tree and
Bayesian network size, potential number of sensor locations, types and complexity
of sensors, and types and advancement of utilized processors. The objective of
this section is to qualitatively evaluate the scalability of Bayesian sensor placement
algorithms.
To analyze the scalability of the protocol, we start with partitioning the al-
gorithm to major subsystems based on algorithm components inputs and outputs.
Figure 5.9 presents the major subsystems of the Bayesian sensor placement algo-
rithm. The main analytical subsystems of the algorithm include generating the state
vectors, Bayesian network, generating sensor information vectors, generating the ev-

































Figure 5.9: BSP subsystems for scalability analysis
size of the system will not have any major impact on the rest of algorithm. The
Bayesian network will be the only subsystem of the algorithm being heavily impacted
by the size of system.
As for Bayesian networks, there are two main classes of inference algorithms,
exact algorithms and approximate algorithms. Exact algorithms are meant to pro-
vide correct answers and typically are more demanding computationally, while, ap-
proximate algorithms are utilized where simplicity of computational methods is more
important than exact answers [40]. We discuss these two categories of Bayesian in-
ference in Section 5.5.1 and Section 5.5.2.
5.5.1 Bayesian Network Exact Inference
The two main classes of Bayesian network exact inference algorithms are based
on the concept of elimination and conditioning.
Variable elimination is a process by which we successively remove variables
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from a Bayesian network while maintaining its ability to answer queries of interest.
The complexity associated with this procedure is exponential relative to the number
of variables in the Bayesian network.
Conditioning algorithms are stemmed from human reasoning practices which
are used in mathematical proofs as well. Based on this methodology, one can solve a
larger problem by breaking it down to smaller cases, given certain assumptions, then
solve the smaller cases under the given assumptions and then combine the results
to obtain a solution to the main problem. There are various methodologies under
“conditioning” process which almost all of them present exponential complexity
relative to the size of Bayesian networks.
5.5.2 Bayesian Network Approximate Inference
The approximate inference of Bayesian networks are grouped in two categories.
One is based on reducing the inference problem to constrained sensor placement
problem and leading it to belief propagation algorithms. The other is related to
algorithms that are based on stochastic sampling. Both methods’ complexities are
significantly less than exponential; however, the trade-off is lower accuracy of the
Bayesian inference. Given that for Bayesian sensor placement algorithm, the amount
of information is the basis for sensor placement algorithm, we concluded that ap-
proximate Bayesian inference will not be appropriate tool for Bayesian inference.
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5.5.3 The Proposed Approach
As discussed, Bayesian network is the most critical part of the proposed
Bayesian sensor placement in regard to scalability. From one stand point, we are
concerned with the number Bayesian network nodes because of the processors’ time
required to analyze the network. Another related concern is that with a larger
Bayesian network comes a higher number of potential sensor locations and in turn a
larger combinatorial selection of sensor placement scenarios. Considering these facts
about the Bayesian network and their effect on the BSP algorithm being affected
by the system size, we propose the following mitigation methods:
• Utilize “approximate inference” for the Bayesian network instead of “exact
inference” when speed of the process is more important than the precision of
the Bayesian network inference.
• Consider Modular approach by breaking up the system to smaller functions
and build the Bayesian model of those modules. This approach will signifi-
cantly decrease the size of each Bayesian network.
• Keep the Bayesian network size to under 500 nodes. Experience shows that
given current commercially available microprocessors’ speed and also available
Bayesian network analysis software programs, the Bayesian networks up to 500
nodes can be reasonably processed.
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter we presented a Bayesian framework for sensor placement for a
partial system of a power transformer. An algorithm was developed to measure the
amount of information for various sensor placement arrangements for a case study.
The prior knowledge of system was used to simulate numerous evidence sets which
in turn provided several posterior information sets in the form of Sensor Information
Vectors. Then information metric function was employed to compare the amount
of information for various sensor configurations and the sensor placement scenario
that would provide the highest amount of reliability information was identified. In
addition, solution for cases with no historical data was discussed. The Chapter




Application of Bayesian Sensor Placement
6.1 Overview
In Chapter 5 we presented the details of Bayesian sensor placement method-
ology in details through a rather simple case study. In this chapter, we present
another example of a more complex system with a larger Bayesian network model
as well as larger historical data sets and more potential sensor places.
6.2 Power Transformer BSP
Considering the fault tree of Figure 6.1 and Bayesian network of Figure 6.2,
we are looking for the sensor placement scenario that would provide the highest
amount of reliability information, given that only four potential sensor places exist
as shown in Figure 6.4 and only three sensors can be used. We assumed that even
the sensor’s type are different, however, the cost of sensors are the same and all
sensors provide equal amount of information.
Referring to Bayesian sensor placement flow chart as presented in Chapter 5,
the following steps are taken.
Step 1. Identify system functional failure modes.















































































































































































































































































Step 2. Identify system failure mechanisms.
The system failure mechanisms include thermal stress, mechanical stress, chemical
stress and electrical stress.
Step 3. Identify relevant stress models.
Arrhenius life-stress model, Eyring relationship, inverse power law, temperature –
non-thermal relationship and general log-linear relationship are among the models
being considered for this example.
Step 4. Choose a logic diagram to present the system.
A fault tree is the chosen logic diagram and it is presented in Figure 6.1.
Step 5. Construct the Bayesian network (BN) of the system.
The system Bayesian network is shown in Figure 6.2.
Step 6. Identify the lower level components of the system (the inputs to BN).
For this example, five inputs (lower level components states) are considered to be
“vibration”, “gas in oil”, “moisture in oil”, “heat” (transformer temperature) and
“tank pressure”. The mechanisms related to gas in oil, moisture in oil and heat
have already been discussed in Chapter 3. Here we present how vibration and tank
pressure would affect the life of a power transformer.
Youn [37] proposed a health grade for power transformers based on monitoring
transformer vibration. The idea is that through various transducers, one measure
the frequencies of transformer vibration at different points such as tank, core, etc.
and records these frequencies for certain period of time and creates a data base. In
addition, the following two metrics were introduced:
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Figure 6.2: Power transformer Bayesian network
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RMS. Root mean square, also known as the quadratic mean or a statistical
measure of the magnitude of a varying quantity (the frequency of vibration in






where µf is the mean at a frequency f .
RSS. RSS is the measure of differences between the mean value µf at a fre-
quency and individual values observed by different sensors at the frequency.






where σf is the standard deviation at frequency f .
Then, based on these two values, which are used as health condition metrics,
a “health grade map” is introduced as shown in Figure 6.3. It presents five grades
of health with “A” being the healthiest and “F” being a failing grade. For this
example, we used this health grade to distinguish the state of “vibration” input in
state vectors.
The transformer tank pressure is another input for the Bayesian network. In
most cases, the tank failures are the result of tank rupture due to electrical shorts
or other similar events [51]. Therefore, the tank pressure is one of the key indicators
and considered as one of the input points to the model. IEEE standard C57.12.10

















Figure 6.3: A transformer health grade map












where Ps is calculated tank pressure withstand, F is time and location (dynamic)
amplification factor, E is fault energy level to withstand, k is arc energy conversion
factor and C is tank expansion coefficient.
Step 7. Identify potential sensor locations.
Four potential sensor sites as shown in Figure 6.4 are considered. They can monitor
system state (top level), bushing, transformer oil, and tank states.
Step 8. Identify sensor types.
Referring to Figure 6.4, four types of sensors for four locations (based on the func-
































Figure 6.4: Power transformer potential inputs and possible sensor locations
Sensor-1: A typical voltmeter as shown in Figure 4.12, is considered for sensor-1
location. It is located on the secondary of the power transformer (through potential
transformers) to monitor whether the transformer is operational or not.
Sensor-2: GridSense bushing monitor as shown in Figure 6.5 is proposed to monitor
the transformer bushings.
Sensor-3: Kelman TRANSFIX online DGA (Dissolved Gas Analysis) and moisture
sensor for power transformers as shown in Figure 4.11 is considered for sensor-3
location.
Sensor-4: There is a wide range of methods to monitor the tank integrity of power
transformers. These include methodologies based on physics of failure of tank ma-
terials at one end of the complexity spectrum all the way to a simple leak detector,
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The BushingIQ™ performs continuous online bushing monitoring to provide early 
warning protection and to reduce unnecessary time based maintenance 
BUSHING FAILURE MODES  
The most common type of bushing failure 
occurs in the internal capacitive layers. 
These failures occur slowly over time with 
one layer failing and burning through the 
insulation. The BushingIQ™  advanced   
warning of bushing failure through sensors 
that detect early changes in the voltage  
amplitude and phase angle. 
BUSHING TAP SENSOR  
 
The Bushing Tap Sensor forms a capacitive voltage divider between the        
operating voltage and the capacitance of the bushing. This sensor protects 
the test tap with quad redundant protection by using the voltage divider 
capacitors and two spark gaps. The sensor measures the condition of the 
bushing’s insulation by using Phasor Values to compute Power Factor.  
MONITORING TECHNIQUE 
The BushingIQ™ monitors Power Factor/
Tan δ from the bushing C1 Test Tap using      
algorithms that simulate the Schering 
Bridge technique, a standard industry 
method of offline testing. This standard 
based method provides early warning of 
a problem bushing. Online tests are per-
formed at rated voltage,  under load, and 
in all weather conditions, as opposed to 
offline testing which is  performed at 
10KV when weather conditions permit. 
This online test detects internal insulation failures  or external issues 
such as surface contamination due to pollution. The condition of the 
bushing is displayed on a 0-100% scale indicating changes in the Power 
Factor/Tan δ. 
COMMUNICATIONS & DATA INTERFACE OPTIONS 
Access to the BushingIQ™ may be obtained on-site or remotely. The 
system can also interface to an existing SCADA system.                     
Communication options include: 
- pcAnywhere™  
- Windows RDP 
- RJ45 Ethernet Interface 
- Serial Interface (ASCII) 
- LCD Touch Panel Display 
- Hardwired or Wireless 
- IEC 61850 
- DNP3 
Figure 6.5: GridSense bushing monitor (courtesy of GridSense Inc.)
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QUALITROL 039 Rem ote electronic oil level indicators
Rem otely m onitor your equipm ent’s oil level
• Overview (#tab1) 
• Features (#tab2) 
• Options (#tab4) 
• Applications (#tab5) 
Local reading level gauge and an electronic rem ote m odule offers continuous indication of the 
liquid level for a transform er’s m ain tank, conservator tank or load tap changer com partm ent. 
Provides a variable resistive output to the rem ote m odule for continuous m onitoring. Rem ote 
m odule has offset and separate high and low gain adjustm ents to allow for exact m atching to the 
local reading level gage.
• Up to 2 switches (contacts) for control and alarm  functions
• 0-1 or 4-20 m A continuous rem ote output for integration into SCADA system s
• Case sensor assem bly (with dial) is designed for use with QUALITROL 032 or 042 oil level 
indicator flange styles for easy retrofit applications
Remotely monitor your equipment’s oil level
• Provides accurate indication of oil level in transform er tank or com ponents
• M agnetically coupled level gauge is m ounted on operating equipm ent while the rem ote 
indicator can be placed in a safer, m ore convenient location
• Easy to read "m in-m ax" style rem ote indicator dial. Special printed dials are also available
Improved transformer protection with electronic output and alarm function
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Figure 6.6: QUALITROL 039 Remote electronic oil level indicators (courtesy of
Qualitrol Company)
at the other end of the complexit spectrum. T e sensor that is suggested here is
a QUALITROL 039 remote electronic oil level indicator that monitor the oil level
within the tank. The idea is that while the tank’s integrity remains intact, the oil
level should stay within an acceptable range. Any deviation from that can be in-
terpreted as anoil tank leak, potentially due to damage or degradation of the tank.
Figure 6.6 shows a sample of this type oil level monitor.
Also, as part of this step, sensor uncertainties are incorporated to the model.
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Step 9. Choose sensor placement scenarios.
Considering four potential sensor locations and a constraint to put only three sen-








where k1 is potential number of sensor locations and k2 represents the number of
sensors are allowed. As stated earlier, it was assumed that even the sensor types are
different; however, the cost of sensors are the same and all sensors provide an equal
amount of information.
We also added one additional scenario with two sensors just to examine how
a case with two sensors would be compared with the reset of three-sensor scenarios.
Therefore, the sensor placement scenarios are:
• Scenario 1: Utilize sensor 1, 2 and 3
• Scenario 2: Utilize sensor 1, 3 and 4
• Scenario 3: Utilize sensor 1, 2 and 4
• Scenario 4: Utilize sensor 2, 3 and 4
• Scenario 5: Utilize sensor 1 and 2 (a test scenario)
and the sensor placement process goal is to evaluate which scenario provides the
highest amount of information should the system constraint is to use only three
sensors.
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Table 6.1: Power transformer state vectors and their probabilities
State Vector x1 ⋯ xj ⋯ x31 x32
Vibration 1 ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 0 0
Gas 1 ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 0 0
Humidity 1 ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 0 0
Heat 1 ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 0 0
Pressure 1 ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 1 0
Probability 0 ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 0.0701 0.4909








Sensor 1 1 1 0 0
Sensor 2 0 0 0 0
Sensor 3 1 0 1 0
Probability 0.0170 0.1075 0.1165 0.7588
Step 10. Generate Components State Vectors.
For this example with five inputs, the components state vector includes thirty two
vectors as shown in Table 6.1.
Step 11. Generate Sensor Information Vectors (SIV).
For sensor placement scenario 1 of this example with three sensors detecting binary
states, the SIV may have up to eight elements. Table 6.2 shows the exact number
of vectors.
Step 12. Choose an information metric function.
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as the information metric function where θ is the unknown of interest. We defined
lower level components probability of failures as the unknowns of interest.
Step 13. Generate samples of unknowns of interest.
Monte Carlo simulation is used to randomly draw joint samples of states of the lower
level components.
Step 14. Simulate component state vectors.
Each randomly drawn set of unknown of interest defines the lower level components
state. Therefore, Monte Carlo simulations was used to randomly draw components
state vectors and computed their probabilities. Table 6.1 presents the results.
Step 15. Simulate sensor information vectors.
Each vector generated on the output of the state vector simulation process is fed
to the system Bayesian network which would generate corresponding output states.
Each set of output states at the suggested location of sensors on logic diagram
generate a vector as described earlier is called a sensor information vector (xsi ). The
same process is repeated for all state vectors to generate system sensor information
vector (x̃s). Table 6.2 presents the vectors and their probabilities
Step 16. Simulate evidences.
Starting with the sensor information vectors of Table 6.2, utilizing Monte Carlo
simulation 100,000 times, and assuming 4 demands each time, a large number of
evidence sets were generated.
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Table 6.3: Power transformer most probable evidence sets - scenario 1
Evid. Apprx. Prob. Number of Observed Failures in Each Info.
Sets of Evid. Set Evidences Set Based on 4 Demands Metric
(i) (Prev(i)) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 UI
1 0.1929 0 0 0 - - 9016
2 0.0931 1 0 0 - - 8175
3 0.0923 1 0 0 - - 8175
4 0.0916 0 0 1 - - 26.61
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ - - ⋯
Table 6.4: Power transformer most probable evidence sets - scenario 2
Evid. Apprx. Prob. Number of Observed Failures in Each Info.
Sets of Evid. Set Evidences Set Based on 4 Demands Metric
(i) (Prev(i)) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 UI
1 0.1788 0 - 0 0 - 9150
2 0.0932 0 - 1 0 - 26.60
3 0.0912 1 - 0 1 - 4015
4 0.0896 1 - 0 1 - 4015
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ - ⋯ ⋯ - ⋯
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Step 17. Compute information metric function values for selected evidence sets.
The information metric function values associated with individual evidence sets for
Scenario 1 are presented in Table 6.3. The expected value of information metric of
Scenario 1 can be calculated by
U I(1) =∑
i
Ui ⋅ Prev(i) = 0.1929 × 9016 + 0.0931 × 8175 +⋯ = 4005. (6.5)
Table 6.4 presents the information metric function values associated with indi-
vidual evidence sets for Scenario 2 and the expected information metric of Scenario
2 can be calculated by
U I(2) =∑
i
Ui ⋅ Prev(i) = 0.1788 × 9150 + 0.0932 × 26.60 +⋯ = 2715. (6.6)
Similarly, Table 6.5 presents the information metric function values associated
with individual evidence sets for Scenario 3 and the expected value of information
metric of Scenario 3 can be calculated by
U I(3) =∑
i
Ui ⋅ Prev(i) = 0.2172 × 4550 + 0.1230 × 5085 +⋯ = 3368. (6.7)
Table 6.6 presents the information metric function values associated with in-
dividual evidence sets for Scenario 4 and the expected value of information metric
of Scenario 4 can be calculated by
U I(4) =∑
i
Ui ⋅ Prev(i) = 0.2022 × 9055 + 0.1166 × 4006 +⋯ = 4512. (6.8)
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Table 6.5: Power transformer most probable evidence sets - scenario 3
Evid. Apprx. Prob. Number of Observed Failures in Each Info.
Sets of Evid. Set Evidences Set Based on 4 Demands Metric
(i) (Prev(i)) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 UI
1 0.2172 4 0 - 0 - 4550
2 0.1230 3 0 - 0 - 5085
3 0.1188 4 0 - 1 - 3079
4 0.1180 3 0 - 0 - 3853
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ - ⋯ - ⋯
Finally, Table 6.7 presents the information metric function values associated
with individual evidence sets for Scenario 5. We included this scenario to just prove
that lower number of sensors would lead to lower amount of information. The
expected value of information metric of Scenario 5 can be calculated by
U I(5) =∑
i
Ui ⋅ Prev(i) = 0.0400 × 8276 + 0.0131 × 6698 +⋯ = 621. (6.9)
Table 6.8 summarizes the information metric values of all five scenarios.
Step 18. Given the constraints, choose the optimum sensor placement scenario.
Reviewing the expected value of information metrics for four scenarios (1 through
4) shows that Scenario 4 utilizing sensors 2, 3 and 4 would provide the highest
amount of information about the system and this scenario is selected as the optimum
placement scenario assuming that only three sensors should be used.
Step 19. Is multi-sensor data fusion required?
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Table 6.6: Power transformer most probable evidence sets - scenario 4
Evid. Apprx. Prob. Number of Observed Failures in Each Info.
Sets of Evid. Set Evidences Set Based on 4 Demands Metric
(i) (Prev(i)) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 UI
1 0.2022 - 0 0 0 - 9055
2 0.1166 - 0 0 0 - 4006
3 0.1164 - 0 0 1 - 4006
4 0.1134 - 0 0 1 - 8896
⋯ ⋯ - ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ - ⋯
Table 6.7: Power transformer most probable evidence sets - scenario 5
Evid. Apprx. Prob. Number of Observed Failures in Each Info.
Sets of Evidence Set Evid. Set Based on 4 Demands Metric
(i) (Prev(i)) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 UI
1 0.0400 0 0 - - - 8276
2 0.0131 1 0 - - - 6698
3 0.0131 1 0 - - - 6698
4 0.0131 1 0 - - - 6698
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ - - - ⋯
120
Table 6.8: Power transformer Bayesian sensor placement
Scenario Sensors Utilization Expected Info. Metric
1 Sensors 1, 2 and 3 4005
2 Sensors 1, 3 and 4 2715
3 Sensors 1, 2 and 4 3368
4 Sensors 2, 3 and 4 4512
5 Sensors 1 and 2 621
Multi-sensor data fusion assumed not to be required.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, another example was presented to show the details of the
proposed Bayesian sensor placement methodology in a more complex system with
a larger Bayesian network model as well as larger historical data sets and more
potential sensor places. In this example, the BSP was utilized to find the best
locations of sensors for a power transformer taking into account all of its subsystems.
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Chapter 7
Bayesian System Health Monitoring
7.1 Introduction
System health monitoring is defined as a set of activities implemented on a
system to assure its operable condition. Monitoring activities are often limited to
the observation of current state of operations. In other cases, systems are monitored
solely for the prediction of future operation status and predictive diagnosis of future
failure states.
System health monitoring and sensor placement are areas of great technical
and scientific interest. Prognostics and health management of a complex system
require multiple sensors to extract required information from the sensed environ-
ment, because no single sensor can obtain all the required information reliably at
all times. The increasing costs of aging systems and infrastructures have become a
major concern and system health monitoring techniques can ensure increased safety
and reliability of these systems. Similar concerns exist for newly designed systems as
well. System reliability monitoring assesses the state of systems health and, through
appropriate data processing and interpretation, can predict the remaining life of the
system.
One way to minimize both maintenance and repair costs as well as the proba-
bility of failure is through continuous health assessment of the system and prediction
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of future failures based on current health and maintenance history. Therefore, one
of the goals of implementing system health monitoring is to alleviate the growing
concern over the maintenance of legacy equipment by replacing scheduled mainte-
nance with as-needed maintenance and saving the cost of unnecessary maintenance,
as well as preventing unscheduled maintenance activities. In other words, system
health monitoring allows condition-based maintenance (CBM) inspection instead of
schedule-driven inspections. Similarly, when new systems are developed and de-
signed, appropriate power system health monitoring can be embedded in a design
which is expected to reduce the life-cycle operating cost.
Another method of utilizing reliability estimates of a system is to formulate
a cost-effective maintenance plan, which is often called reliability centered mainte-
nance (RCM). The goal of RCM methodologies is to find logical ways to identify
what equipment is required to be maintained on a preventive maintenance basis
rather than let it run to failure.
This chapter presents Bayesian system health monitoring techniques, com-
bined with previously discussed Bayesian sensor placement methodology for moni-
toring systems’ health.
7.2 System Health Monitoring Philosophies and Techniques
System health monitoring techniques are focused on improving the reliability
of systems and predicting the systems’ health to minimize unscheduled downtime.
Maintenance philosophies, in a very broad term, can be divided into “reactive” and
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“proactive”. In the reactive category, the system is repaired after being broken;
therefore, almost all of the maintenance activities, result in unplanned downtime.
The proactive approach, responds primarily to equipment assessment and predic-
tive procedures. The proactive maintenance practices can be further divided to
“preventive maintenance” and “predictive maintenance”.
In preventive maintenance strategy, all systems, subsystems and equipment
go through scheduled preventive maintenance with the goal of reducing the chance
of failures and or degradation. Intervals are selected such that to balance the cost
of regular maintenance and cost of system failure due to unscheduled downtime.
Often, these types of maintenance start after the system has reached a certain age.
The predictive maintenance philosophy is based on adaptively determined
maintenance schedules. In order to properly perform predictive maintenance, it
is extremely important to accurately predict the health of a system and its compo-
nents.
Predictive maintenance techniques can be organized in three main categories:
reliability-based maintenance, model-based techniques, and statistical methodolo-
gies [52]. This might be a rather subjective categorization and perhaps one may
put the reliability-based and statistical methodologies in the same category. We
attempt to describe these techniques further in the following sections.
Reliability-based maintenance. Various techniques are utilized to estimate the
time to failure distribution of systems. Even though these methodologies are being
used for a long time, however, many of them suffer from low precision. Their main
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downside is that often in one system, different failure mechanisms exist and they
interact with each other, mostly in unknown manner.
Model-based techniques. In this approach, an ideal mathematical model of the
system is constructed and the outputs of the model are continuously compared with
signals received through the sensors from the actual system. The goal is to identify
faults or potential failures through these comparisons. The main shortcomings of
this methodology include: model errors may be significant, sensors’ uncertainties
are mostly ignored, and almost always it is assumed that the collected data from
the actual system is non-overlapping which is a significant assumption.
Statistical-based methods. Statistical-based maintenance techniques are primar-
ily use Bayesian statistics for modeling and reasoning the causal relationships and
uncertainties as well as for updating the state of knowledge for unknowns of inter-
est. Often, these statistical models are incorporated with prognostics and health
management (PHM) techniques as well.
7.3 The Proposed Bayesian System Health Monitoring Methodology
System health monitoring techniques can ensure increased safety and reliability
of systems. System health monitoring can also ease the maintenance difficulties
by replacing the regular / scheduled maintenance with planned maintenance and
provide relief in schedule and cost saving by eliminating unnecessary maintenance
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and shut downs. Similar concerns exist for newly designed systems as well. System
health monitoring assesses the state of systems’ health and, through appropriate
data processing and interpretation, can predict the remaining life of the system.
Presence 
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Figure 7.1: Process algorithm for calculating probability of failure
The framework for the proposed Bayesian system health monitoring concept
is shown in Figure 7.1. For this single sensor system, the sensor detects the physical
phenomenon and through an algorithm which takes into account the failure modes,
failure mechanisms, physics of failure and various standards and codes, and trans-
lates the physical phenomenon to component states. This is shown in the top part
of Figure 7.1. The states are then fed to the Bayesian network of the system to be
monitored. The Bayesian network provides the probability of failure for subsystem
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of interest as well as probability of failure at system level based on that specific
instantiation (also called a truth assignment, a variable assignment, or a variable
instantiation). This provides a snapshot of system health (or the complement of the
probability of failure) based on one observation.
This process can be expanded to multiple sensors for more precise estimates.
The process can also be set up as a dynamic monitoring system such that through
consecutive time steps the system sensors perform observations and send data to
the Bayesian network for continuous health assessment. This makes the Bayesian
network a dynamic Bayesian network.
Another important fact about the proposed Bayesian system health monitor-
ing, in conjunction with Bayesian sensor placement, is that every instantiation of
Bayesian network would update the entire Bayesian network which in turn would
provide updated information at every node of the Bayesian network.
Assuming that Bayesian sensor placement or other sensor placement method-
ologies have already been utilized to identify the optimum location of sensors through-
out the system to be monitored, the following steps can be followed to design a
Bayesian system health monitoring scheme.
Step 1. Identify system functional failure modes, failure mechanisms and related
physics of failure.
Step 2. Construct the Bayesian network (BN) of the system.
Step 3. Identify the lower level components of the system (the inputs to BN).
Step 4. Generate Components State Vectors.
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Step 5. Generate Sensor Information Vectors (SIV) when binary outputs are de-
sired and perform Bayesian sensor placement. Alternatively, other sensor placement
methods can be utilized as well.
Step 6. Place sensors at the “input” nodes of the Bayesian network as defined in
BSP algorithms. See Figure 7.2.
Step 7. Optimum sensor placement nodes that resulted from BSP, are the nodes
that the Bayesian network values are to be utilized in system health monitoring.
Step 8. Transform the Bayesian network to “dynamic” Bayesian network by set-
ting a time period between instantiations of Bayesian network by components state
vectors and recording the SIV (or BBN values at designated nodes).
Step 8. Archive and plot dynamic Bayesian network outputs for further analysis
depending on specific application.
The following section provides an example of the proposed dynamic Bayesian
system health monitoring for health assessment of a power transformer.
7.4 Application of Bayesian System Health Monitoring
Considering the previous example as shown in Figure 7.1 and assuming one
year between the readings and monitoring the system over ten years, we recorded
sensor data points to monitor “vibration”, “gas in oil”, “humidity in oil”, “tank
pressure” and “transformer temperature”. The results are recorded in the table
presented at the bottom of Figure 7.3. This table summarizes the probability of

























Figure 7.2: Bayesian network of the power transformer and sensor locations
network. Going back to Figure 7.3, the top part of this figure shows the trend of
probability of failure at four locations: at system level, bushing, oil and tank. In
other words, these probability of failures are the Bayesian network inference based
on earlier knowledge of the system and each set of sensor readings every year.
In very broad terms, Figure 7.3 shows monitoring of a power transformer for
ten years (reading once a year) with the goal of anomaly identification. The graphs
also show how the health of the system and subsystems degrade through the years.
For example, in this graph it is apparent that power transformers, comparing to
many other electrical equipment, degrades rather slowly.
One important observation in Figure 7.3 is the trend of system health through
the set period of time that these graphs provide. This means we are more focused
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Time (Year) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Probability of Presence (%)
Vibration 9.12 9.12 19.41 19.41 28.65 37.58 37.58 54.63 60.09 93.05
Gas in Oil 9.17 9.17 16.81 28.78 28.78 33.56 25.19 40.24 66.89 90.99
Hum in Oil 11.76 11.76 21.05 36.36 44.44 44.44 47.6 49.38 66.67 66.67
Tank Pressure 12.28 12.28 23.54 30.55 30.55 29.1 38.11 43.49 60.62 60.62
























Figure 7.3: System health monitoring for power transformer at subsystems and
system level
on the overall health of the system or any of its subsystems over a period of time
rather than just snapshots of health at certain points of time.
Another note regarding Figure 7.3 is the consideration of uncertainties associ-
ated with the value of parameters, accuracy of sensors, state of components (which
they have their own distributions), and the uncertainties on physical parameters.
When all of these uncertainties exist, the real system health assessment would be
more accurately presented when shown within their uncertainty upper and lower

























Figure 7.4: System health monitoring for power transformer with uncertainty upper
and lower bands
included the abovementioned uncertainties and schematically plotted ±3% total un-
certainty for system failure, ±2.5% total uncertainty for bushing failure, ±5.5% total
uncertainty for oil failure, and ±4% total uncertainty for tank failure.
Figure 7.5 shows the previous power transformer system probability of failure
graph with three color-coded regions – green, yellow and red – to present the health
status of the transformer at system level. In the green region, the probability of
failure of the system is within an acceptable margin of risk. The yellow region
represents a relatively mild risk operation region that requires actions to be taken in
the near future. The red region represents a very high-risk area in which immediate
action must be taken.
Figure 7.6 shows a schematic diagram of the control panel of a Bayesian system




























Time (Year) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Probability of Presence (%)
Vibration 9.12 9.12 19.41 19.41 28.65 37.58 37.58 54.63 60.09 93.05
Gas in Oil 9.17 9.17 16.81 28.78 28.78 33.56 25.19 40.24 66.89 90.99
Hum in Oil 11.76 11.76 21.05 36.36 44.44 44.44 47.6 49.38 66.67 66.67
Tank Pressure 12.28 12.28 23.54 30.55 30.55 29.1 38.11 43.49 60.62 60.62
Heat 10.44 10.44 20.41 20.41 33.99 36.3 36.3 38.48 56.18 96.25
Figure 7.5: System health monitoring for power transformer
and six subsystems. System health monitoring approach as presented in Figure 7.6
can also be used as a methodology to identify precursors to failure at each subsystem
as well as at system level. Similar techniques can be utilized for re-evaluating the
results of accelerated life tests for determining the reaming life of a product or
system.
The presented Bayesian system health monitoring methodology may also be
used for the following applications where due to physical, technological or resource












































Figure 7.6: Schematic diagram of a power transformer system health monitoring
panel
• To infer the health of a system (e.g. top level in a fault tree) based on limited
number of sensor information points at certain subsystems (upward propaga-
tion),
• To infer the health of a subsystem based on knowledge of the health of main
system (downward propagation),
• To infer the health of a subsystem based on knowledge of the health of other
subsystems (distributed propagation).
The previous example shows the significance of the proposed Bayesian sensor
placement in health monitoring where degradation in complex systems is difficult to
detect. A large system may encounter multiple faults within its subsystems through-
out its lifetime, however none may lead to a failure or loss of operation. Therefore,
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it is important to have a mechanism to monitor the progression of degradation for
mission critical operations.
It is also important to note that as described in Section 5.5, Bayesian net-
works provide inference with some degree of approximation depending on what type
approximation are considered. Therefore, we have to be mindful of the degree to
which we are confident in the conclusions made by a Bayesian network. Therefore,
when an extreme level of precision is necessary, we may require to perform sensitiv-
ity analysis where we are interested in the sensitivity of probabilistic queries with
respect to changes in the network parameters of a Bayesian network.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented a Bayesian system health monitoring methodology
in conjunction with the proposed Bayesian sensor placement discussed in previous
chapters. The chapter started with an introduction on system health monitoring
and then followed by an overview of current system health monitoring philosophies
and techniques. This is followed by details of the proposed Bayesian system health
monitoring methodology. The chapter ended with a presentation of an application
of Bayesian system health monitoring in an example and presented various scenarios
as part of this example.
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Chapter 8
Summary, Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Summary and Conclusions
This research developed a new algorithm for Bayesian sensor placement under
uncertainty and utilized it in a new system health monitoring methodology. The
methodology is designed to answer important questions such as how to infer the
health of a system based on a limited number of monitoring points at certain sub-
systems (upward propagation); how to infer the health of a subsystem based on
knowledge of the health of the main system (downward propagation); and how to
infer the health of a subsystem based on knowledge of the health of other subsystems
(distributed propagation).
Specifically, the main objectives of this research were to (1) find an effective
way for functional sensor placement under uncertainty, and (2) develop a system
health monitoring approach with both prognostic and diagnostic capabilities with
limited, uncertain, and overlapping information sensing and monitoring points.
Uncertainties considered in the analyses include:
• Sensor uncertainty
• Uncertainty on parameters of physics of failure models
• Uncertainty on relations between components and system (or the conditional
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probability tables (CPT) in Bayesian network of the system)
• Uncertainty on unknowns of interest.
The proposed Bayesian sensor placement methodology significantly reduces the
computation complexities through Bayesian network modeling, mainly by eliminat-
ing the need for calculating complicated likelihood functions. The sensor placement
methodology was tested on a simple case study followed by a more detailed example.
Contributions of the research include:
• A new functional point sensor placement method based on Bayesian techniques
is developed which is capable of functional sensor placement under uncertainty.
– Bayesian networks are utilized for modeling, updating and reasoning the
causal relationships and uncertainties as well as for updating the state
of knowledge for unknowns of interest as they are defined by: failure
probabilities of lower level components, subsystems or system; value of
parameters; and the probability of physical parameters taking specific
values.
– “Information metric” is used for sensor placement based on the amount
of information each possible sensor placement scenario provides.
– The sensor placement process is based on sensors functional locations on
a logic diagram.
– Taken into account the uncertainty inherent in the characteristics of sen-
sors.
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– To model the case study and other presented examples, several algorithms
in MATLAB and other software programs are developed.
• A new system health monitoring methodology is developed.
– The system is capable of assessing current state of a system’s health and
can predict the remaining life of the system (prognosis), and through
appropriate data processing and interpretation can point to elements of
the system that have or are likely to cause system failure or degradation
(diagnosis).
– The system can be set up as a dynamic monitoring system such that
through consecutive time steps, the system sensors perform observations
and send data to the Bayesian network for continuous health assessment.
This makes the Bayesian network a dynamic Bayesian network.
8.2 Future Work
Similar to any other new methodology, our approach presents multiple areas
for improvement too. One area is the use of Bayesian network and its exponential
complexity with the increased size of the network. This is also true for almost any
algorithm that uses Bayesian network. Another area is dependency to historical
data or evidence data that may not be available for every system. Again, this is
perhaps true for any analysis that would require historical data. Lastly, our reliance
on physics of failure of components may pose challenges as these physics of failure
data are not always available which is also true for other methodologies too. Chapter
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5 discussed these issues and presented potential solutions. In this section we present
suggestions for future research on these and other related topics.
Future research work can focus on creating a graphical user interface (GUI)
for all of the algorithms and software programs that were written for this project.
A roadmap for developing that GUI could be the Bayesian sensor placement flow
chart in Figure 5.1. To make it practical for a wide range of applications, it may
include categories of sensors such as physical, electromagnetic, etc. and for each
category it may include an exhaustive list of various sensors available in the market
with their specifications, a picture, etc. as shown in Table 8.1. The GUI may
also include detailed lists of known failure modes, failure mechanisms, physics of
failure models and stress life models. The GUI may also include integration of the
analytical engine with the Bayesian network engine and offer a user interface with
the Bayesian network for data input and assessment.
Future implementations of the methodology should investigate efficient ana-
lytical modeling techniques associated with incorporating sensor uncertainties. We
incorporated sensor uncertainty into the model Bayesian network by updating the
Bayesian network with related probabilities associated with sensors uncertainties.
This is based on the assumption that “uncertainty” data will be available in the
form that can be incorporated into the Bayesian network. Obviously, this assump-
tion cannot be generalized. The specific goal for this investigation could be the
development of sensor uncertainty analysis procedure to be added to the Bayesian
sensor placement methodology.
Utilization of extended Kalman filter (EKF) [53] as a virtual sensor for non-
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Table 8.1: Sample sensor data sheet
Product Name: ACR SmartButton Temperature Data Logger
Manufacturer: ACR Systems Inc.
Temperature Sensor: -40○C to +85○C range
Measurement Accuracy: ±1○C from -30○C to +45○C
Power Rating: 3.0 volt Lithium, approximate 10 year battery life
Size: 17.35mm diameter × 5.89mm height
Weight: 4 grams
Interface with host: Serial port or USB
Interface type: RS232 serial ACR SmartButton interface
or USB/ACR SmartButton
Mounting details: Magnetic backing or plastic plate mount
Number of sensor’s channels: 1
Channel configuration: One internal channel for ambient temperature
Type of sensors Temperature sensor
that can be connected:
Ability to connect No
to external sensors:




measurable states and unknown parameters, can be another topic for further in-
vestigation [54]. This virtual sensor can be added to the sensor information vector
(SIV) and eventually become part of the sensor placement scenarios. This could
possibly enhance the Bayesian sensor placement even more without the added cost
of real sensors.
Future research topics also need to include the investigation of methods to
account for sensitivity at various points of the sensor placement.
Development of analytical models for scalability analysis of Bayesian sensor
placement algorithms could be another topic for future research.
Also, future related research work needs to investigate potential applications
of influence diagrams in sensor placement. Influence diagrams have great potential
for this application and given that there are several commercially available software
that can process influence diagrams, it makes it a great candidate to be considered
as another tool for sensor placement [55], [56], [57].
Finally, another potential future work could be on researching the possibility
of combining the Bayesian network sensor placement methods developed in this
research with Jackson and Mosleh [5], [6], [7] likelihood algorithms in a Hybrid
Causal Logic (HCL) model. HCL is capable of merging a deterministic model, such
as a fault tree, with non-deterministic factors, such as uncertain soft data collected
by sensors under one framework. Jackson’s likelihood algorithms were developed for
binary data sets and binary propagation of data through the system being analyzed.
Bayesian sensor placement can deal with soft data such as sensors measurements and
sensors uncertainties, and also can easily propagate this information throughout the
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system’s Bayesian network. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods utilize
deterministic relationships among the basic events and combine them to generate
various risk scenarios. Among these deterministic approaches are fault trees, event
trees, and event sequence diagrams. Given that for many instances, probabilistic
risk assessment is not a purely deterministic domain, it is prudent to consider non-
deterministic factors such as uncertain soft data collected by sensors, in overall risk
assessment methodologies. As described earlier, Bayesian belief networks have the
capability to probabilistically model these soft data. The combination of these two














Figure 8.1: Illustration of a three-layer hybrid causal logic
Trilith (also known as IRIS) software is capable of generating a decision sup-
port system that implements the Hybrid Causal Logic methodology, combining the
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Boolean logic-based PRA methods such as fault trees and event trees with BBN. The
Hybrid Causal Logic core extends conventional risk analysis techniques to include
the ability to deal with uncertain or unavailable data.
Groth et al [58] presented a detailed analysis of the functionality of the HCL
computational engine. The framework includes a multi-level modeling approach that
allows different PRA techniques to be applied to different parts of a system. Risk
scenarios are modeled in the top layer using Event Sequence Diagrams. In the second
layer, fault trees are used to model the factors contributing to the properties and
behaviors of the physical system (e.g., hardware, software, environmental factors).
Bayesian belief networks comprise the third layer, which extends the causal chain
of events to potential soft data such as uncertainties in sensor detection [58].
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